Krugman: "Save" the Euro by Creating Another Unsustainable Boom

In his latest column, Paul Krugman explains why he believes that the euro has been crashing, and in part, I agree. Europe, he says, is not like the United States which actually is a unified country which also has a federal government that spreads its own spending programs throughout those states. (This is not in praise of those programs, but rather an admission that there is more tying the USA together than what we see in the European Union.)

Furthermore, I agree with Krugman that the housing boom especially covered the underlying flaws of the EU and its currency. Krugman writes:

Why did the euro seem to work for its first eight or so years? Because the structure’s flaws were papered over by a boom in southern Europe. The creation of the euro convinced investors that it was safe to lend to countries like Greece and Spain that had previously been considered risky, so money poured into these countries — mainly, by the way, to finance private rather than public borrowing, with Greece the exception.

And for a while everyone was happy. In southern Europe, huge housing bubbles led to a surge in construction employment, even as manufacturing became increasingly uncompetitive. Meanwhile, the German economy, which had been languishing, perked up thanks to rapidly rising exports to those bubble economies in the south. The euro, it seemed, was working.

I even agree with Krugman's next statement:

Then the bubbles burst. The construction jobs vanished, and unemployment in the south soared; it’s now well above 20 percent in both Spain and Greece. At the same time, revenues plunged; for the most part, big budget deficits are a result, not a cause, of the crisis. Nonetheless, investors took flight, driving up borrowing costs. In an attempt to soothe the financial markets, the afflicted countries imposed harsh austerity measures that deepened their slumps. And the euro as a whole is looking dangerously shaky.

At that point, however, the agreement stops, as Krugman then decides that the best way to "fix" the crisis is essentially to engage in an economic version of "hair of the dog." He writes:

What could turn this dangerous situation around? The answer is fairly clear: policy makers would have to (a) do something to bring southern Europe’s borrowing costs down and (b) give Europe’s debtors the same kind of opportunity to export their way out of trouble that Germany received during the good years — that is, create a boom in Germany that mirrors the boom in southern Europe between 1999 and 2007. (And yes, that would mean a temporary rise in German inflation.) The trouble is that Europe’s policy makers seem reluctant to do (a) and completely unwilling to do (b).

I must admit that even though I have read Krugman for many years, something like this shocks me. The European and U.S. economies have been suffering in the aftermath of the collapse of the housing bubble, and the response of governments and central banks has been to try to recreate boom conditions somewhere else via easy credit and monetary expansion. We see how well that has worked.

So now Krugman claims that Europe and the euro will be saved if the EU Central Bank can do in Germany pretty much what it did in Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. And what happens when that boom/bubble in Germany collapses, as it inevitably would?

That's easy. Krugman will demand that the authorities create a bubble somewhere else. Maybe he wasn't joking in 2003 when he called for the creation of a housing bubble in the USA. And when the bubble crashes, then he can blame private enterprise.

Say what? Issue more debt to relieve a debt crisis? Only in Wonderland!

The name of this blog came from a commentary I wrote for Forbes nearly three years ago, but I would add that the writers and editors of the New York Times seem to be living in their own Wonderland. This is a newspaper that took the confabulated "evidence" in the Duke Lacrosse Case and insisted that it all made sense when people living in the Reality World saw it and wondered how in the heck a D.A. managed to find a rape case wrapped up on that nonsense.

Unfortunately, the delusion that is the NYT is not limited to imaginary crimes being committed by "young men of privilege." No, the NYT still is insisting that we can and should "spend our way" out of this financial crisis. In today's editorial, we see yet another plea for central banks and governments to unleash another round of debt in order to enable sinking governments to...repay debt.

(Remember that the NYT was all over Karl Rove for his "reality-based world" comments when he was the de facto political officer for the Bush administration. While I agreed with the editors' assessment of Rove's comments then, I only can conclude that Rove Disease has overtaken the NYT editorial offices.)

The editorial is insisting that governments don't cut back on borrowing and spending (and increasing taxes) because if they stop borrowing, then won't be able to repay their debts:

Excessive indebtedness is a real, long-term problem. But Europe’s broad downward trajectory can only be turned around if governments — both those of lenders and debtors — spend more in the near term to put people back to work and get consumers back to spending.

The proper interpretation of those words is as follows: "We need to stop drinking, but in the interim, another round for the house! Let us make a toast to ending toasts...in the future!"

This is not, of course, what the editors actually seem to believe. Like Hitler's generals in the Berlin bunker who were insisting to the bitter end that they could win World War II, the editors are insisting that another round of borrowing and spending (and more taxation) THIS time will take hold and that economic growth will be just around the corner:

As the crisis quickens, more enlightened voices struggle to be heard. Christine Lagarde, the new managing director of the International Monetary Fund, is calling for balancing long-term debt reduction with “short-term support for growth and jobs.” The financier George Soros this week renewed his pleas for more growth-friendly policies, as has Gordon Brown, the former British prime minister.

What do the editors mean by "growth-friendly policies"? They mean more borrowing, more government spending, more subsidies, higher marginal tax rates, higher fuel taxes, more regulation, destruction of industries such as energy industries that still are profitable, more criminal penalties for normal business transactions, and broader welfare policies.

Yes, I am sure that all of these things will enable the economies of the USA and Europe to grow. Increase burdens upon individuals and businesses, make it easier to throw people into prison, print money, increase government borrowing, increase anti-business rhetoric, and expand the police powers of the state, and out of this is going to come that unicorn known as "economic growth." Create a little boom now and we will figure later how to deal with the inevitable bust.

Only in Wonderland.

Krugman and Austrians: the depression will get worse

While Austrians and Keynesians don’t agree on a lot of things, there is one thing upon which they both seem to agree: the U.S. economy is sinking into the morass of depression. At that point, however, the agreement ends, as the two schools have very different explanations as to why this is happening.

The Keynesians, through their Paul Krugman and the New York Times megaphone, have been claiming that the original Barack Obama “stimulus” was too little, and the current emphasis upon budget cutting at all levels of government is exactly the wrong strategy. Austrians, not surprisingly, believe that this explanation is nonsense, and dangerous nonsense.

In a recent column, Krugman lays out his thesis, and it is useful, for it truly exposes the Keynesian mind at work, and a Keynesian mind that allows for no other explanations as to what is happening. The problem is – and always will be – a lack of “aggregate demand,” and the only solution is for governments to spend as though they hit the jackpot.

He writes:

The great housing bubble of the last decade, which was both an American and a European phenomenon, was accompanied by a huge rise in household debt. When the bubble burst, home construction plunged, and so did consumer spending as debt-burdened families cut back.

Everything might still have been O.K. if other major economic players had stepped up their spending, filling the gap left by the housing plunge and the consumer pullback. But nobody did. In particular, cash-rich corporations see no reason to invest that cash in the face of weak consumer demand.

Nor did governments do much to help. Some governments — those of weaker nations in Europe, and state and local governments here — were actually forced to slash spending in the face of falling revenues. And the modest efforts of stronger governments — including, yes, the Obama stimulus plan — were, at best, barely enough to offset this forced austerity.

So we have depressed economies. What are policy makers proposing to do about it? Less than nothing.

If anything described the Keynesian mindset, it is this: Spend, spend, spend. It is a simple thesis, one that certainly appeals to politicians, and even to much of the general public, and has dominated professional economic thinking in the USA since World War II. As Krugman has stated above, households cannot spend what they don’t have, and businesses are not going to invest (read that, spend through capital investment – which always is defined by Keynesians as being valuable because of spending, not by aspects of capital productivity) because they don’t see future demand.

So, we are stuck in what Krugman and Keynesians call a “liquidity trap,” which Krugman seems to believe ends all other discussion. (The notion is that the Law of Opportunity Cost is suspended during a “liquidity trap” because interest rates are low, resources are “idle,” and government can borrow at near-zero percent and spend without consuming any resources. As Krugman said in his book, The Return of Depression Economics, government spending in this situation can create a “free lunch.” He actually used that term.)

While most mainstream economists are not willing to engage the Keynesians on the idea of the “liquidity trap,” Murray Rothbard did not back away. In his book, America’s Great Depression, he takes on the whole notion of the “liquidity trap” head on, writing:

The ultimate weapon in the Keynesian arsenal of explanations of depressions is the "liquidity trap." This is not precisely a critique of the Mises theory, but it is the last line of Keynesian defense of their own inflationary "cures" for depression. Keynesians claim that "liquidity preference" (demand for money) may be so persistently high that the rate of interest could not fall low enough to stimulate investment sufficiently to raise the economy out of the depression.

Rothbard points out a serious problem with that analysis, noting that Keynes never got the theory of interest correct, claiming interest is based upon “’liquidity preference’ instead of time preference,” which then leads to more incorrect conclusions about the state of the economy. Other Austrians have criticized the theory, as well, including William Hutt and Henry Hazlitt.

Both Hutt and Hazlitt took on the whole idea of “idle resources,” which is behind the notion that opportunity cost can be suspended during a depression. The idea of “idle resources” is based upon a notion that factors of production are unemployed because of a lack of spending, and that a burst of government borrowing (at near-zero, which means almost no opportunity cost) will spread to these unemployed assets and put them back to work.

As I noted before, the Keynesian theory is disarmingly simple; resources are unemployed, so government “stimulates” the economy through more spending, the resources are put to work, and somehow, the economy magically sustains itself. On the flip side, Keynesians hold that if new spending does not occur, then deflation will result, making more resources unemployed until ultimately the economy is in a perverse equilibrium in which huge numbers of people are out of work with no prospects for economic improvement.

Krugman is adamant about this point and is so convinced of his rightness that anyone who might disagree does so only because that person wants to see people suffer or because that person is so beholden to the “discredited” Austrian theories that he or she is incapable of adding anything to the public debate. (In fact, Krugman believes there is no debate at all. His position is right, is proven empirically, and cannot be refuted – even when it is refuted.)

Thus, even though we have seen an explosion of government spending the past few years, according to Krugman, we really are on an “austerity” plan. Why? It is because if the government actually had increased spending on a massive scale, then we would be out of this depression. In other words, since there is only one way out of this morass, and since we are not out of that morass, there hasn’t been enough government spending.

What about the Robert Higgs thesis of “regime uncertainty”? Krugman dismisses that one, too, derisively calling it the “confidence fairy.” Businesses, he argues, are hoarding cash because they see a lack of consumer demand. If governments spend and spend and spend, then businesses will invest, period.

(As for the anti-business rhetoric pouring out from the White House, the surge in regulation, and the demonizing of the oil and coal industries – which are essential players if this economy is going to recover – all of that, according to Krugman, either is non-existent or just white noise, and it certainly has no relevance to our current situation. Why? Because Krugman says so.)

The ultimate answer, according to Krugman and the Keynesians, is to find yet another boom, another possible asset bubble that can work its “magic” at least for a while before it, too, collapses. (Perversely, in a post endorsed by Krugman, Karl Smith hopes that it will be another housing boom.

In reading Krugman and the Keynesians, I always am struck by their notion that assets, economically speaking, really are homogeneous. It doesn’t matter where new spending is directed, just as long as there is spending. Spend, and everything else falls into place.

Second, the Krugman/Keynesian viewpoint is based on an extremely mechanistic interpretation of human action. People within a market setting do not purchase goods they believe will meet their individual needs; no, they spend, as though the spending itself is the ultimate end of an economy.

This is a view that separates production and consumption, making them independent of one another with no true purposeful human action to be found anywhere. There is no meaningful connection between desires of consumers and the valuation of factors of production or the direction that factors go in the various lines of production. It all is something that simply can be described as Y = C + I + G with no need to think further than that tautology.

As I said at the beginning, both Austrians and Keynesians believe we are headed for a steeper economic downturn, perhaps into the abyss of a major depression. However, Krugman and the Keynesians believe that the only salvation is for massive spending and intervention by government. Austrians believe that it is the massive spending and intervention by government that makes things worse, and while Krugman and Company never will admit otherwise, it ultimately is the Austrian paradigm that explains these matters, and explains them with accuracy.

"Spending" versus Consumption: Does Economic Theory Actually Assume People are Human?

Keynesians and Austrians have a lot of economic and philosophical differences, some of which I have tried to spell out on this blog. However, in my view, other than the implied assumption about "homogeneous factors" and the Keynesian view that one can do specific economic analysis with nothing but aggregates, perhaps the greatest gulf between Austrians and Keynesians comes in how people from those camps view actual human economic behavior.

I believe that Krugman, in this blog post ("The Economic Narrative"), does all of us a favor by explaining his position and unwittingly laying out the real differences between the Keynesians and Austrians. If I can reduce it to one sentence, it would be: Keynesians ignore the fact that human beings engage in purposeful economic behavior. Krugman writes:

A straight Keynesian analysis implied the need for a much bigger program, more oriented toward spending, than the administration proposed. And people like me said that at the time — we’re not talking about hindsight.

If, indeed, an economy were a mechanistic operation in which we robotically put inventory on the shelves and then "spend" so we can clear the shelves (so we can put more stuff on the shelves again), then Krugman would be correct. A government program to encourage spending would do the trick.

However, because what Krugman calls spending actually involves purposeful behavior by individuals, we are dealing with different perspectives on the matter. Krugman implies that an economy is made up of two detached arms, one that produces and the other that spends. They are disassociated from one another, and if spending does not occur in large enough amounts or quickly enough, then the other side breaks down.

Austrians, on the other hand, believe that the economy is a very complex web in which producers look to meet the needs of consumers, needs that consumers will meet by purchasing goods. This process is not mechanistic, by any means. Moreover, the processes are related; more production means more consumption, as the base of our "purchasing power" is not how much money government can put into the economy, but rather our ability to produce those goods that people want.

Although Krugman (as we saw in an earlier post) has recognized the presence of asset bubbles, he then turns around and denies that the boom produces systematic malinvestments. However, what does he think a bubble is, anyway? It is the creation of malinvestments.

Yeah, We Needed Just a Few Trillion More Dollars of "Stimulus"

I had no idea that Ezra Klein is a brilliant economist, but apparently he agrees with Paul Krugman, so he needs no more qualifications. Granted, he had his flash of brilliance more than a year after Krugman's epiphany, but nonetheless he still is brilliant.

Klein's "insight" is that the government did not spend enough money this past year. Krugman, on the other hand, said last year that the "stimulus" was not generous enough and would fail to stem the economic downturn. Here is Klein:

The original stimulus package should've been bigger. Rep. David Obey, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, says the Treasury Department originally asked for $1.4 trillion. Sen. Kent Conrad, chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, wanted $1.2 trillion. What we got was a shade under $800 billion, and something more like $700 billion when you took out the AMT patch that was jammed into the package. So we knew it was too small then, and the recession it was designed to fight turned out to be larger than we'd predicted. In the end, we took a soapbox racer to a go-kart track and then realized we were competing against actual cars.

This was a mistake, of course. But the mistake may not just have been the size of the stimulus package. I wonder if it wasn't fed by a belief that there'd be other chances. If all we needed was the $700 billion package, then great. But if unemployment remained high and the recovery had trouble taking hold, surely there would be the votes for further stimulus and relief spending. No one in the political system could possibly look at 10 percent unemployment and walk away from it, right?

Wrong. Ten percent unemployment and a terrible recession ended up discrediting the people trying to do more for the economy, as their previous intervention was deemed a failure. That, in turn, empowered the people attempting to do less for the economy. So rather than a modestly sized stimulus leaving the door open for more stimulus if needed, its modest size was used to discredit the idea of more stimulus when it became needed.

So, for lack of an extra $400 billion, all we got was this lousy depression. Krugman last year declared:

...many economists, myself included, actually argued that the plan was too small and too cautious. The latest data confirm those worries — and suggest that the Obama administration’s economic policies are already falling behind the curve.

To see how bad the numbers are, consider this: The administration’s budget proposals, released less than two weeks ago, assumed an average unemployment rate of 8.1 percent for the whole of this year. In reality, unemployment hit that level in February — and it’s rising fast.

So, if I am to interpret this stuff correctly, had Obama had Tim Geithner sell just another $400 billion of Treasuries to the world, the economy would have gained "traction" (Krugman's favorite term) and we would be bouncing toward recovery as we speak.

Sorry, folks, that dog won't hunt. The problem was not that we spent too little; the problem was that the government refuses to understand that credit-fed booms are unsustainable and that this Keynesian "hair of the dog" strategy (in which we don't take just a little whiskey, but drink an entire case) is doomed to failure.

Ironically, in the name of "avoiding the mistakes of the 1930s," our government is taking us down the same path that Hoover and FDR took us. Happy Unemployment, America.