Showing posts with label Federal Reserve. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Federal Reserve. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Is North Korea "stimulating" the world economy?

It seems that there is alarm over alleged counterfeiting by North Korea, which supposedly is creating a number of $100 fake bills that are hard to detect as counterfeits.

I would like to know why anyone in the USA would oppose such a thing, given that North Korea is doing what Paul Krugman in The Return of Depression Economics claimed creates a "free lunch": printing money. Why would it be OK for the Federal Reserve System to do what Krugman recommends -- directly purchasing short-term U.S. Treasury paper in order to fund U.S. Government spending -- but wrong if North Korea essentially does the same thing?

It seems to me that Krugman should be writing a blog post or column praising North Korea for its "stimulus" efforts.

Monday, November 14, 2011

Keynesians: Fight the collapse of the bubbles by creating bigger bubbles

In 2002, Paul Krugman made his infamous statement:
To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a snapback; it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do that, as Paul McCulley of Pimco put it, Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.
Krugman, of course, later defended his comments to claim that he did not think such a thing to be desired, but nonetheless the underlying Keynesian principle was there: in order to fight a slump in "aggregate demand," the government must think and act boldly, or, to be more accurate, recklessly.

Indeed, Krugman's fellow Keynesian, Lawrence Summers, has taken this Keynesian principle in the same direction, recently declaring:
The central irony of financial crisis is that while it is caused by too much confidence, too much borrowing and lending and too much spending, it can only be resolved with more confidence, more borrowing and lending, and more spending. (Emphasis mine)
While Summers is recommending yet another attempt to reflate the housing bubble (in the name of "fixing" the housing market), the larger principle is the same: inflate SOMETHING. However, as I see it, Keynesians such as Krugman and Summers have overlooked the obvious, and that is the sad fact that governments around the world -- and especially the U.S. Government -- have created the Mother of All Bubbles with government paper. Indeed, as I will point out, the government debt bubble that has been created since the housing bubble fell apart about four years ago dwarfs whatever Wall Street produced with its subprime paper, and the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve System (with Keynesians on the sidelines acting as cheerleaders) are hellbent on "solving" the current bubble-created crisis by unleashing massive inflation.

Before going on, however, I believe I need to point out the obvious: economic "theories" that declare that economies can grow only by the financial system creating phantom assets should be scrutinized and called what they really are: fraudulent. We have to understand that Keynesians now are saying that the financial system and the economy-at-large are at the point where the value of money must be ground down to near-zero in order to maintain our present economic standard of living.

Surely, people should be able to step back and understand just how destructive such beliefs really are, but instead, they are the core of current government policies and they dominate academic economics to the point where dissenters really are being cast into the Outer Darkness Where There Is Weeping And Gnashing Of Teeth. Indeed, in academic economics, the loudest criticism of the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve System has been that it has not inflated enough, that is, make the bubble in government paper even bigger in hopes that all of this finally will give the economy what Krugman calls "traction" and it can move on its own.

Now, Krugman and the others give no explanation as to how this can occur; they simply take it as an article of faith: the economy moves because the economy moves. They respond to dissent with, "No soup for you!"

However, we need to understand that the blizzard of public spending and borrowing now does not reflect the actual performance of the economy (present or future), but rather is just another bubble, this time with government securities. Furthermore, as debt markets go, it is pretty darned unregulated, chock full of moral hazard, and utterly unpayable. As for responsible policy, let us just say that the government policies of the past four years make the Housing Bubble look like the epitome of financial responsibility.

If a bubble means the blowing up of the value of assets well beyond any values as set by their fundamentals, then the government paper bubble easily fits that definition. I say this for the following reasons:
  • The amount of debt the government openly admits to having is staggering, almost $15 trillion, and with the government financing about 40 percent of all its present spending via borrowing, we are not dealing with a situation like that of post-World War II, when the national debt as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product was higher than it is now. In other words, while U.S. debt fell rapidly after the war, right now it is growing like mad.
  • There is no way the U.S. economy can pay its way out of this debt trap, and all of the "experts" are calling for accompanying inflation to allow the government to slowly repudiate its debt or what Krugman has called "deleveraging." (Krugman holds that inflation is good because it is a form of debt repudiation.)
  • The budget numbers do not account for all of the hidden but very real liabilities that government obligations to Freddie and Fannie, Social Security and Medicare, which up those numbers at least another $50 trillion. These are paper obligations, obviously, as the U.S. economy will not perform well enough in any of our lifetimes to be able to meet these numbers. In other words, after a crisis caused in large part by moral hazard, the government has increased the amount of moral hazard in the system. Summers lives!
So, why do I say that we are in a government-paper bubble? After all, financially speaking, U.S. government paper is every bit as toxic as the sub-prime paper that collapsed Lehman and would have collapsed a number of other banks and financial houses. Yet, as Krugman happily points out, the interest rate on government bonds is extremely low, which he then uses to claim that the "market" is bullish on the U.S. Government and specifically the Obama administration.

Now, I find it strange that someone like Krugman who believes that markets usually get things wrong and only can operate properly under rigid state control all of a sudden is claiming that the Fed-manipulated low interest rates on U.S. bonds actually reflects the market view of things. If anything, the high price of U.S. bonds tells us that the rest of the economy, not to mention the troubles of the euro and the European Union, are in the tank even more than the government will admit.

In other words, the market for U.S. Government paper is not popular because of any underlying strength, but because it is perceived as being less awful than the situation in Europe. Krugman, of course, sees things differently. U.S. bonds are strong, he argues, because the government can print its own money, something I covered in this post. He writes:
Think about countries like Britain, Japan and the United States, which have large debts and deficits yet remain able to borrow at low interest rates. What’s their secret? The answer, in large part, is that they retain their own currencies, and investors know that in a pinch they could finance their deficits by printing more of those currencies. If the European Central Bank were to similarly stand behind European debts, the crisis would ease dramatically.
One hopes that Krugman would believe that such a scenario could not go on forever, with the government using "clever lawyers" (in Krugman's words) to have the Fed directly purchase government bonds instead of buying them (as the law states) on the secondary market.

Keynesians seem to believe that this is an optimal solution, if Krugman is representative of that group. Ultimately, the "Krugman Solution" would result in massive inflation, which would be a default by other means.

What we do know is that the massive government debt, be it in the USA or in Europe, cannot be paid back, especially since governments now are borrowing in order to fund their own debt services. This is not sustainable, not at all. And given that the dollar value of the government debt overwhelms anything we saw in the housing market, the future is not pretty.

There was another path we could have taken. We could have let the banks and financial houses that were holding mortgage securities to take the necessary haircuts and even go out of business if they were hopelessly insolvent. Despite what the Keynesians claim, the entire economy would not have collapsed, but I am sure that some CEOs would have lost their Connecticut mansions.

Likewise, instead of trying to find ways to prop up the unsustainable housing market, the government instead should have told the banks and mortgage holders that there would be no Uncle Sugar bailouts, and they would have to negotiate with borrowers instead of expecting the government to stand behind them as they went wily-nily with foreclosures. Yes, I believe there would have been a short and severe recession, but the difference is that we would be in a real recovery now.

Instead, we are in a depression. The economy is stuck at an "official" rate of 9 percent unemployment and probably an unofficial rate that is much higher, and there is no hope of a real and sustainable recovery in the future. Instead of looking to market entrepreneurs and at least getting out of the way of the still-profitable and productive entities in our economy, the Obama administration has decided to fight this downturn with massive subsidies and a vast number of new regulations that is raising the cost of doing business.

In other words, Obama and Krugman actually believe we can have a recovery by directing resources from higher-valued to lower-valued uses. That is not a prescription for bringing the economy back; it is a prescription for dragging down this economy until it reaches Third World status.

Monday, June 20, 2011

Princeton University Economics: there is no such thing as opportunity cost

Because I am a holder of a doctorate from a program that was not "elite" by any standards, perhaps I don't understand the power that "elite" economists have in their possession to do away with economic laws. While Paul Krugman is on vacation, his Princeton colleague, Alan Blinder, gives us the latest howlers.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Blinder wonders how anyone might think that lots and lots of federal spending would be "job killing." Impossible! Blinder huffs:
It is easy, but irrelevant, to understand how someone might object to any particular item in the federal budget—whether it is the war in Afghanistan, ethanol subsidies, Social Security benefits, or building bridges to nowhere. But even building bridges to nowhere would create jobs, not destroy them, as the congressman from nowhere knows. To be sure, that is not a valid argument for building them. Dumb public spending deserves to be rejected—but not because it kills jobs.

The generic conservative view that government is "too big" in some abstract sense leads to a strong predisposition against spending. OK. But the question remains: How can the government destroy jobs by either hiring people directly or buying things from private companies? For example, how is it that public purchases of computers destroy jobs but private purchases of computers create them?

One possible answer is that the taxes necessary to pay for the government spending destroy more jobs than the spending creates. That's a logical possibility, although it would require extremely inept choices of how to spend the money and how to raise the revenue. But tax-financed spending is not what's at issue today. The current debate is about deficit spending: raising spending without raising taxes.

For example, the large fiscal stimulus enacted in 2009 was not "paid for." Yet it has been claimed that it created essentially no jobs. Really? With spending under the Recovery Act exceeding $600 billion (and tax cuts exceeding $200 billion), that would be quite a trick. How in the world could all that spending, accompanied by tax cuts, fail to raise employment? In fact, according to Congressional Budget Office estimates, the stimulus's effect on employment in 2010 was at least 1.3 million net new jobs, and perhaps as many as 3.3 million.
This is a most interesting economic worldview. While Blinder might be "technically" correct in that if government borrows a trillion dollars and spends it on whatever, then in the very short term, no doubt there would be new employment. Would it create new wealth? That is another matter, and would it be sustainable? probably not.

Yet, Blinder really doubles back on himself in that first paragraph. Let me repeat what he said:
But even building bridges to nowhere would create jobs, not destroy them, as the congressman from nowhere knows. To be sure, that is not a valid argument for building them. Dumb public spending deserves to be rejected—but not because it kills jobs.
What would constitute "dumb public spending," given that he believes that government spending "creates jobs," even "dumb" spending. What is the criteria for determining that the spending is "dumb," and why would it matter, anyway?

No doubt, Blinder would employ an opportunity cost argument but then he contradicts that argument not only within his sentence, but also further down in the article. He states:
A second job-destroying mechanism operates through higher interest rates. When the government borrows to finance spending, that pushes interest rates up, which dissuades some businesses from investing. Thus falling private investment destroys jobs just as rising government spending is creating them.

There are times when this "crowding-out" argument is relevant. But not today. The Federal Reserve has been holding interest rates at ultra-low levels for several years, and will continue to do so. If interest rates don't rise, you don't get crowding out. (emphasis mine)
So, all that is needed to eliminate "crowding out" (which also is opportunity cost in action) is for the Fed to hold down interest rates by mere fiat? (Oh, I forgot. Ben Bernanke was the chair of the economics department at Princeton before going to the Fed, and he still is listed as being on the faculty there. If one is a Princeton economist, a mere declaration can eliminate that pesky thing called opportunity cost.)

Is all of this spending "job killing"? If one goes by Blinder's ultra-short term view of spending and "job creation," then it is not "killing" jobs. However, if one sees this spending along with other government efforts to prop up the economy as impeding the liquidation of malinvestments and impeding a real recovery, then by all means the government spending spree is killing jobs by the millions.

Friday, June 3, 2011

Who is to blame for the coming downturn?

When Barack Obama took office, Paul Krugman urged him to emulate Franklin Roosevelt, and it looks as though Obama might just achieve what FDR did: have a depression within a depression.

As the economy begins another long and sad slide, Krugman is claiming that our government just did not spend enough money the past few years, and that is why we are headed south:
Back when the original 2009 Obama stimulus was enacted, some of us warned that it was both too small and too short-lived. In particular, the effects of the stimulus would start fading out in 2010 — and given the fact that financial crises are usually followed by prolonged slumps, it was unlikely that the economy would have a vigorous self-sustaining recovery under way by then.
Krugman's retrospective is his usual self-aggrandizing nonsense, the idea being that had Obama borrowed and spent an extra trillion, dollars, Krugman then would have argued for two trillion, and had the administration dumped two trillion, Krugman would have demanded four. And so it goes.

What Krugman does not say is that like FDR, Obama went on a regulatory rampage, and on top of that, the government continues to pursue wars abroad and now openly admits to having CIA-sponsored death squads roaming the globe in search of the "bad guys." Obama has openly demonstrated himself to be quite hostile to private enterprise (of the non-subsidized variety), and the government through the Federal Reserve System is showering the world with dollars, yet he wonders why U.S. business firms do not engage in long-range capital planning and expenditures.

As Robert Higgs notes in this excellent essay, the Roosevelt administration created huge amounts of "regime uncertainty," which led to a slowdown of private investment. It seems that Obama, through his rhetoric, his initiatives, and the brazen hostility of Washington toward private investment, we are seeing a repeat.

Krugman, of course, won't mention this point, and why should he? Keynesians believe that all we need to do is to shower an economy with money and everything else follows. Well, it doesn't.

Friday, February 11, 2011

The Great Inflationist Kneecapper

In an interview many years ago, Victor Navasky, the former editor of The Nation, described the New York Post as an entity that would "kneecap" anyone it did not like, and he did a "rat-a-tat-tat" imitation with his hands. (Not that Navasky and The Nation ever would do such a thing themselves.)

Economists at one time did not publicly kneecap each other. They hardly were (or are) angels behind the scenes, and I have been witness to some real ugliness that has transpired in economics departments, and ideology really had little or nothing to do with the infighting.

Over the years, I have been privileged to have met economists who won Nobel prizes and read their material. Some were forceful in what they wrote, and others were not, but even in their popular press columns, they never launched outright personal attacks on other economists, and when they mentioned others, they dealt with their arguments as they understood them.

I guess that Paul Krugman represents a new era in how Nobel-winning economists present themselves in public, and his column on Rep. Ron Paul's hearing on the Federal Reserve System once again crosses that line of civility and decency. (Perhaps it is better to argue that Krugman long ago crossed the line and decided just to stay there, and maybe build a mansion.)

It is perhaps ironic that Rep. William Lacy Clay, a congressman from St. Louis, launched the personal attacks (of which Krugman clearly approves) on Dr. Thomas DiLorenzo by claiming that Austrian Economics is "unscientific" because it relies upon deductive logic. As anyone who has taken a logic class knows, the ad homimen, appeal to authority, and the like fall into the category of "informal fallacies," yet, Krugman obviously likes to employ them. Clay also relied heavily upon such fallacies in his "proof" that Dr. DiLorenzo was a fraud.

Now, I always have learned that if one wishes to attack the position of another person, one first should do some fact-checking. First, Krugman's comments:
One of the hearings was called by Representative Ron Paul, a harsh critic of the Federal Reserve, who now has an oversight role over the very institution he wants abolished in favor of a return to the gold standard. Mr. Paul’s subcommittee called three witnesses, one of whom was an odd choice: Thomas DiLorenzo, a professor at Loyola University and a senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

What was odd about that choice? Well, Mr. DiLorenzo hasn’t actually written much about monetary policy, although he has described Fed policy — not just recently, but since the 1960s — as “legalized counterfeiting operations.” His main claim to fame, instead, is as a critic of Lincoln — he’s the author of “Lincoln Unmasked: What You’re Not Supposed to Know About Dishonest Abe” — and as a modern-day secessionist.

No, really: calls for secession run through many of Mr. DiLorenzo’s writings — for example, in his declaration that “healthcare freedom” won’t be restored until “some states begin seceding from the new American fascialistic state.” Raise the rebel flag! (Emphasis mine)
Now, here is Dr. DiLorenzo's reply:
The junior high schoolish smart aleck Paul Krugman, who writes for that well-known leftist tabloid the New York Times, wisecracks about the Ron Paul Fed hearings in his recent column where he says that I was writing about the Fed as “a legalized counterfeiting operation” as far back as the 1960s. That’s unlikely since the very first thing that I ever wrote that was published was an article for the peer-reviewed Southern Economic Journal in 1980, shortly after I finished graduate school. He must have me confused with Ludwig von Mises or Murray Rothbard. I guess all Austrians look alike to some people.
Now, why does Krugman go rabid at any criticism of Abraham Lincoln? He explains:
He (Lincoln) was, after all, the first president to institute an income tax. And he was also the first president to issue a paper currency — the “greenback” — that wasn’t backed by gold or silver.
Yes, Lincoln was a "stimulus" sort of guy, someone who liked to print money. However, if one reads through the Krugman columns, one finds that anyone critical of such an action is to be labeled...well, whatever Krugman wants to call him. A racist? Yes. An ignoramus? Yes.

So, Paul Krugman is becoming unleashed. Disagree with him on monetary policy, global warming, the current inflation situation, taxes, and whatever else and you are not simply wrong. No, you oppose all these things because you are evil. You want people to lose their jobs and be unemployed and poor forever. There is no other explanation.

Monday, August 16, 2010

About that Social Security "Trust Fund"

In his column today, Paul Krugman defends Social Security and (of course) demonizes anyone who might raise any objections. As he writes, people who raise questions (he claims that would be "Conservatives"): "...hate Social Security for ideological reasons: its success undermines their claim that government is always the problem, never the solution."

Now, my sense is that we are dealing with a non sequitur, but Krugman uses those a lot. However, I'm not going to debate the merits of SS today, but rather deal with one statement that Krugman has made regarding the "trust fund." He writes:
About that math: Legally, Social Security has its own, dedicated funding, via the payroll tax (“FICA” on your pay statement). But it’s also part of the broader federal budget. This dual accounting means that there are two ways Social Security could face financial problems. First, that dedicated funding could prove inadequate, forcing the program either to cut benefits or to turn to Congress for aid. Second, Social Security costs could prove unsupportable for the federal budget as a whole.

But neither of these potential problems is a clear and present danger. Social Security has been running surpluses for the last quarter-century, banking those surpluses in a special account, the so-called trust fund. The program won’t have to turn to Congress for help or cut benefits until or unless the trust fund is exhausted, which the program’s actuaries don’t expect to happen until 2037 — and there’s a significant chance, according to their estimates, that that day will never come. (Emphasis mine)
Here is the problem: the "special account" is nothing more than short-term government paper that matures every six months. At the present time, most government debt is paid via...more government debt -- plus interest. Now, this looks nice, officially-speaking, but the problem is that the mechanism for turning this bond-laden "trust fund" into cash is for the government to sell the bonds.

Now, if I know Krugman, he would say (as would James K. Galbraith) that this is no problem, because the Federal Reserve System can buy the bonds. (He has not said this, I know, but I suspect that would be in his arsenal of answers.) In other words, the ultimate "backing" for Social Security is a glorified and "sophisticated" mechanism of printing money.

So, I would not exactly call this a sound system of "investment." My sense is that Krugman is trying to score ideological points, not promote good finance.

Monday, August 9, 2010

Krugman: The State is Light

[Update, Thursday, August 12, 2010, 9:20 AM]: I have deleted Wednesday's post on scientific fraud because I am not sure that the false temperature listing was deliberate. There may have been an error by the satellite readings that people did not pick up until later. I do try to make sure that what I put on my website is reasonably accurate, and I am not sure that what I have alleged is true, given the information I have now. [End Update]

On August 3, 1914, British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey looked out of the window of the Foreign Office and watched as workers lit the street lamps for the approaching nightfall. Germany had just invaded Belgium, Europe was at war, and Parliament the next day would declare war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, and much of the world would be plunged into the horror of World War I.

Grey then made his famous and prophetic statement: "The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our time," and the slaughter of 10 million soldiers and countless civilians in the next four years would prove his point.

In his column today, Paul Krugman plays off that statement, but puts things in a different context. The lamps are going out, but they are going out because the state does not seize enough property and resources from Americans:
The lights are going out all over America — literally. Colorado Springs has made headlines with its desperate attempt to save money by turning off a third of its streetlights, but similar things are either happening or being contemplated across the nation, from Philadelphia to Fresno.

Meanwhile, a country that once amazed the world with its visionary investments in transportation, from the Erie Canal to the Interstate Highway System, is now in the process of unpaving itself: in a number of states, local governments are breaking up roads they can no longer afford to maintain, and returning them to gravel.

And a nation that once prized education — that was among the first to provide basic schooling to all its children — is now cutting back. Teachers are being laid off; programs are being canceled; in Hawaii, the school year itself is being drastically shortened. And all signs point to even more cuts ahead.

We’re told that we have no choice, that basic government functions — essential services that have been provided for generations — are no longer affordable. And it’s true that state and local governments, hit hard by the recession, are cash-strapped. But they wouldn’t be quite as cash-strapped if their politicians were willing to consider at least some tax increases. (Emphasis mine)
Why are we in this terrible, terrible state? It is because Goldstein's legions, er, the few Republicans left in Congress, have not properly worshiped the Greatness of the State. (Of course, this assumes that Republicans actually shrink government, but I have seen no evidence of that claim in the past 30 years, when the Republican Party was at its strongest since before the Great Depression.)

Krugman goes on:
...the federal government, which can sell inflation-protected long-term bonds at an interest rate of only 1.04 percent, isn’t cash-strapped at all. It could and should be offering aid to local governments, to protect the future of our infrastructure and our children.

But Washington is providing only a trickle of help, and even that grudgingly. We must place priority on reducing the deficit, say Republicans and “centrist” Democrats. And then, virtually in the next breath, they declare that we must preserve tax cuts for the very affluent, at a budget cost of $700 billion over the next decade.

In effect, a large part of our political class is showing its priorities: given the choice between asking the richest 2 percent or so of Americans to go back to paying the tax rates they paid during the Clinton-era boom, or allowing the nation’s foundations to crumble — literally in the case of roads, figuratively in the case of education — they’re choosing the latter.

It’s a disastrous choice in both the short run and the long run.

In the short run, those state and local cutbacks are a major drag on the economy, perpetuating devastatingly high unemployment.

It’s crucial to keep state and local government in mind when you hear people ranting about runaway government spending under President Obama. Yes, the federal government is spending more, although not as much as you might think. But state and local governments are cutting back. And if you add them together, it turns out that the only big spending increases have been in safety-net programs like unemployment insurance, which have soared in cost thanks to the severity of the slump.

That is, for all the talk of a failed stimulus, if you look at government spending as a whole you see hardly any stimulus at all. And with federal spending now trailing off, while big state and local cutbacks continue, we’re going into reverse.
So, we are to assume that the U.S. Government is just wallowing in money when, in fact, it is borrowed money, money that U.S. taxpayers ultimately must repay. (Of course, what will happen is that the government will repudiate the debt via inflation, which also is a tax, albeit a more hidden tax.)

But that is not all. We are supposed to think that the government is sitting on piles and piles of cash, but Goldstein selfishly is letting rich people keep some of their income, and then those evil rich people also are sitting on that cash. So the problem is that those who have the money are not spending it, and that is why we are in recession. And why are they not spending the money? Krugman explains with this non sequitur:
How did we get to this point? It’s the logical consequence of three decades of antigovernment rhetoric, rhetoric that has convinced many voters that a dollar collected in taxes is always a dollar wasted, that the public sector can’t do anything right.

The antigovernment campaign has always been phrased in terms of opposition to waste and fraud — to checks sent to welfare queens driving Cadillacs, to vast armies of bureaucrats uselessly pushing paper around. But those were myths, of course; there was never remotely as much waste and fraud as the right claimed. And now that the campaign has reached fruition, we’re seeing what was actually in the firing line: services that everyone except the very rich need, services that government must provide or nobody will, like lighted streets, drivable roads and decent schooling for the public as a whole.

So the end result of the long campaign against government is that we’ve taken a disastrously wrong turn. America is now on the unlit, unpaved road to nowhere.
Now, the last time I ever heard anything about "Welfare Cadillacs" was in the 1960s, more than four decades ago. Since then, the American State at all levels has grown fantastically, and while I have heard some rhetoric from Republicans about "big government," nonetheless the reality of governmental expansion belies whatever politicians might say.

Yet, according to Krugman, the problem is that the state does not swallow enough wealth. I suppose that he believes that perhaps had his hero FDR been successful in his attempt to levy a 100 percent tax on all incomes above $25,000 (he tried to do this with an executive order in 1942, but Congress struck down his attempt and the courts did the rest), then we would be a rich, happy country right now.

Furthermore, states and localities are cutting back spending just like the rest of us because the U.S. economy is in a serious recession, and, contrary to what Krugman tells us, the recession did not happen because of anti-government rhetoric or rich people or the lack of high tax rates. There is this problem of causality, and, unfortunately, Krugman confuses cause with effect.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Paul Krugman Endorses Bernie Madoff!

In his post today, Paul Krugman unwittingly gives an endorsement of the disgraced Bernie Madoff, the Ponzi king who will die in prison, unable to spend the millions that he stole through fraudulent means. Yes, yes, I know that Krugman has not actually mentioned Madoff by name, but he does throw his considerable influence behind the financing of Social Security, which actually is the greatest Ponzi scheme in world history.

Now, before the defenders of Krugman go ballistic, I would love to ask Krugman and his followers this question: If Social Security is a legitimate funding scheme, then why is Bernie Madoff in prison? Let me further explain.

Krugman writes the following:
We went through all this at length back in 2005, but let me do this yet again.

Social Security is a government program funded by a dedicated tax. There are two ways to look at this. First, you can simply view the program as part of the general federal budget, with the the dedicated tax bit just a formality. And there’s a lot to be said for that point of view; if you take it, benefits are a federal cost, payroll taxes a source of revenue, and they don’t really have anything to do with each other.

Alternatively, you can look at Social Security on its own. And as a practical matter, this has considerable significance too; as long as Social Security still has funds in its trust fund, it doesn’t need new legislation to keep paying promised benefits.

OK, so two views, both of some use. But here’s what you can’t do: you can’t have it both ways. You can’t say that for the last 25 years, when Social Security ran surpluses, well, that didn’t mean anything, because it’s just part of the federal government — but when payroll taxes fall short of benefits, even though there’s lots of money in the trust fund, Social Security is broke.

And bear in mind what happens when payroll receipts fall short of benefits: NOTHING. No new action is required; the checks just keep going out.
Well, not exactly. The current "surpluses" from SS are borrowed by the U.S. Government to fund part of its deficit spending. Thus, the government owes the government money. While there are surpluses, the whole thing looks sound, but when there are deficits, the money needs to come from somewhere, and that will be the printing press or the Fed's application of its powers to create "money" from thin air.

If this sounds somewhat like Madoff's scheme, that is because it is Madoff with its own twist. When Bernie ran "surpluses," he paid benefits to people who already had given money to his "fund." However, at some point, the Madoff stash began to run deficits and everything went to hell after that.

Madoff, of course, could not print money, nor could he borrow from the central bank indefinitely. THAT is the only difference between SS and Madoff, period.

So, Krugman says that those who raise questions about the future of SS are "lying." No, they are not lying. They are those old-fashioned people who think that printing money is not the same thing as creating real wealth. So, who is not telling the truth here?

Sunday, May 9, 2010

Krugman: More Unemeployment is a "Good" Jobs Report

The latest issue of Econ Journal Watch has an article by Brett Barkley on how economists change their interpretation of economic events when a person of their own party takes over the White House. Barkley looked at 17 economists, and while 11 were consistent, and five changed their outlooks somewhat, on economist changed his viewpoints in a significant way: Paul Krugman.

Somehow, I am not surprised, as Krugman has been a loud partisan voice instead of a voice of reason. His commentary on the latest jobs report from the government provides another example of partisanship. He writes:
An actually good employment report. A reminder: there are two separate surveys, one of employers — which is where the 290,000 jobs number comes from — and one of households, which is where the 9.9 percent unemployment rate comes from. Sampling error, seasonal adjustments, and other technical factors can make these reports give contradictory indications.
Unfortunately, as he later adds, the economy won't be adding jobs as quickly as it did during the Clinton years. However, he fails to put two and two together.

In the past few years, the federal government has gone on a spending spree, starting with the unwise bailouts and Federal Reserve System initiatives when it became clear the economy was moving into crisis mode. We have high unemployment not (as Krugman says) because the "stimulus" was not "bold enough," but rather because the government continues to print money in order to prop up weak sectors.

If Krugman wonders why we are looking at high unemployment for the next generation, he might want to look in a mirror, for the high-deficit policies of borrowing and spending have been disastrous.

Monday, April 26, 2010

Yes, Paul, I Agree: The Rating Agencies ARE Corrupt

In his column today, Paul Krugman takes on the Rating Agencies, such as Moody's, that were giving AAA marks to sub-prime debt that turned toxic. His comments here are on the mark:
Let’s hear it for the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Its work on the financial crisis is increasingly looking like the 21st-century version of the Pecora hearings, which helped usher in New Deal-era financial regulation. In the past few days scandalous Wall Street e-mail messages released by the subcommittee have made headlines.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that most of the headlines were about the wrong e-mails. When Goldman Sachs employees bragged about the money they had made by shorting the housing market, it was ugly, but that didn’t amount to wrongdoing.

No, the e-mail messages you should be focusing on are the ones from employees at the credit rating agencies, which bestowed AAA ratings on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of dubious assets, nearly all of which have since turned out to be toxic waste. And no, that’s not hyperbole: of AAA-rated subprime-mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006, 93 percent — 93 percent! — have now been downgraded to junk status.

What those e-mails reveal is a deeply corrupt system. And it’s a system that financial reform, as currently proposed, wouldn’t fix.
He is right about the out-and-out whoredom of the agencies and I also agree that Financial Reform as is being touted right now would not solve the problem.

The issue, however, is why the once-staid and sober Moody's and Standard & Poors turned into a bunch of financial drunkards in a relatively short period of time. That is where Krugman and I differ.

As an economist, when I see something perverse like what happened, I look for the underlying reasons, and especially the structure of incentives that helped bring about this whole regime change in how the agencies went about their business. While I am sure Krugman gives lip service to incentives, he prefers the Keynesian line about "deregulation," which tends to be the ideological umbrella under which he works.

A friend of mine who is a first-rate accountant said that mortgage bankers told her that what seemed absolutely silly and reckless after the bust made perfect sense when the easy money regime was ruling. This is vital to understanding the boom-and-bust, as Austrian Economists point to the actions of the Federal Reserve System holding down interest rates and flooding the markets with credit.

Now, Krugman at the end does give lip service to incentives, but he still misses the bigger picture. Had the Fed not been reckless with interest rates and dumping credit everywhere, the incentives for the ratings industries would have been different, period. As Peter Schiff said last year, "The whole country was drunk." The real question, he asks, is who brought the booze.

This is where Krugman and the Austrians differ. We believe that if the Fed is not playing the credit sugar daddy, the incentives that run with an easy money financial regime will not be there. (This is not excusing Moody's and S&P for not doing their jobs, but rather giving a reason as to why they took flight from sound finance.)

Krugman, on the other hand, believes that the Fed should continue providing the liquor, but the regulators will tell Wall Street when, where, and how much to drink. This is a recipe for later problems that will be worse than what we are facing now.

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

What if Bailouts ARE Inevitable?

In an earlier post, I wrote that Paul Krugman is basing a lot of his policy analysis upon the belief that future Wall Street bailouts are inevitable. Given what has transpired in the past few decades, I would say that he very well might have a point.

Thus, by beginning with the assumption that there will be bailouts, Krugman then mentally reconstructs a financial system that will never need to be bailed out, or where bailouts where be rare. How would such a system be organized, and what would it do?

While Krugman has not put out a hugely-detailed plan, some things clearly are in view. First, all of the financial organizations, including banks and the financial houses such a Goldman-Sachs, would be strictly regulated by the SEC. (However, the SEC currently regulates these institutions, so my guess is that what he proposes is that the SEC be given more power than it currently has, the idea being that more regulation will keep meltdowns from occurring.)

On the other hand, as noted in earlier posts, Krugman also favors the Fed aggressively lowering interest rates to below-market levels, which not only would be inflationary but would discourage savings. (Of course, Krugman, being a good Keynesian, attacks savings as lowering "aggregate demand.") So, we have the prospect of the Fed opening the money spigots and the SEC trying to route it to "safe" investments.

In a speech last year, Peter Schiff pointed out that depending upon the SEC to vet all firms actually creates larger problems because market participants are not as careful about their choices. He gave the example of con artist Bernie Madoff, noting that had people not been fooled by the lack of SEC oversight, the market would have flushed out Madoff long before his empire fell.

I think Schiff is on to something here. Krugman seems to believe that since bailouts are inevitable, we need a very strict SEC to vet everything, and a Fed to turn up the crank, and somehow that will give us prosperity -- and will keep bailouts from ever being reality. All that is needed, he claims, is for regulators to be "smart" and "believe in government."

What Krugman does not say is that having the federal bureaucracy determine the direction of investing will be disastrous. Do we really want the risk-averse, bureaucratic culture to run our economy, because THAT is what would happen.

I have a better idea. Require banks to hold 100 percent reserves and tell all financial firms that if they fail, they fail on their own. Unfortunately, our current political culture favors bailouts, and if that culture continues, we are going to find that "finance" will mean nothing more than borrowing and paying off government debt.

Monday, April 19, 2010

Krugman Fails to Answer the Pertinent Question: Who Made This Meltdown Possible?

With the SEC's recent filing against Goldman-Sachs, it looks as though the government is doing its best to deflect attention from its own role in the financial meltdown while blaming it on everyone who attended the drunken party, while failing to include the Federal Reserve System, which was the main supplier of the financial alcohol.

As I have said before, there is plenty of blame to go around. Wall Street executives were not exactly refusing to put the Fed's alcohol in the punchbowl and did everything possible to encourage the whole country to partake. Unfortunately, unless we get to the most important lesson -- that the Fed played the most important single role in creating the meltdown -- then we really are going to living in a repeat of "Groundhog Day."

In his column today, Paul Krugman repeats the tired canard that it was a lack of regulation that created the conditions for the meltdown. The capitalists were greedy, and the Bush administration -- lovers of free markets all -- simply stood by while the system went to hell. Furthermore, as the SEC alleges, it seems that some firms actually were shorting mortgage securities while, at the same time, promoting them. (Investors call it a "straddle," and it is common practice for people who trade in options.)

Krugman asks:
So what role did fraud play in the financial crisis? Neither predatory lending nor the selling of mortgages on false pretenses caused the crisis. But they surely made it worse, both by helping to inflate the housing bubble and by creating a pool of assets guaranteed to turn into toxic waste once the bubble burst.
As readers know, I tend to be much more skeptical about allegations of fraud, simply because I have seen federal prosecutors use the term too many times and clearly in situations in which no one intended to engage in what traditionally is known as deception. I'm not going to say that real-live criminal fraud does not exist on Wall Street or that there were fraudsters in the mix before the meltdown.

However, it is easy to dismiss everyone as a crook instead of understanding that the biggest engine of fraud on Wall Street was not Goldman-Sachs, as bad as the firm might be. No, it was the Fed.

Krugman and I both agree that the housing boom and all that it entailed was not sustainable. (Although, there is nothing in the Keynesian theory that says a boom, even a housing boom, cannot go on forever, just as long as government provides the money.) We even agree that the Fed was holding down interest rates.

The disagreement comes at this point, and it is huge. Krugman has defended the Fed's policy of having artificially-low interest rates, claiming that regulation can steer the money in the right direction. He writes:
But did I call for low interest rates? Yes. In my view, that’s not what the Fed did wrong. We needed better regulation to curb the bubble — not a policy that sacrificed output and employment in order to limit irrational exuberance.
In other words, after the Fed brings the liquor to the party, it then will effectively regulate its consumption. However, cheap money carves its own trails.

There is another point. Krugman goes off on a number of derivatives and swaps, but he forgets that the underlying reason Wall Street could do this was because the Fed was showering The Street with easy money. You cannot have an easy money regime AND sound investments. It just won't happen.

Friday, April 16, 2010

Krugman on Fire for Faulty Finance

Keynesians are nothing if not versatile. Until ObamaCare was signed into law, Paul Krugman was a "healthcare" economist (which really is a person with a Ph.D. in economics who believes that government can work magic through coercion in doling out medical care).

However, at this time, Krugman now is foremost a "financial" economist, which means a person with a Ph.D. in economics who believes that government can run the nation's financial system with brilliance and efficiency. Yes, yes, I know that there is this problem with the government's accounting methods (although Krugman believes that government under Democrats, no matter how fraudulent its accounting methods, still is magic), but Krugman being a True Believer thinks that government regulators are omniscient (if they are "smart" and they "believe in government") and can get past the problems that would bedevil most mortals.

In his Friday, April 16, column, Krugman repeats his usual tricks of rewriting history and then claiming that all that is needed to "save" the financial system is to bring back the financial cartels that dominated U.S. finance from the New Deal until the early 1980s. Of course, that means his methods are utterly predictable: claim that Republicans want financial failure and then blame Ronald Reagan for everything. In other words, truth really does not matter.

Before going further, let me emphasize that I have no faith in whatever Republicans are promoting in Congress. When they were in power, they used Wall Street like their own private piggy bank, and it blew up in their faces. Nonetheless, while I don't trust them in power, I do find that at least some of the rhetoric they are using now actually has some truth in it.

In likening Sen. Mitch McConnell's arguments against provisions in the Democrats' plan to calling for the abolishing of fire departments, Krugman writes:
In his speech, Mr. McConnell seemed to be saying that in the future, the U.S. government should just let banks fail. We “must put an end to taxpayer funded bailouts for Wall Street banks.” What’s wrong with that?

The answer is that letting banks fail — as opposed to seizing and restructuring them — is a bad idea for the same reason that it’s a bad idea to stand aside while an urban office building burns. In both cases, the damage has a tendency to spread. In 1930, U.S. officials stood aside as banks failed; the result was the Great Depression. In 2008, they stood aside as Lehman Brothers imploded; within days, credit markets had frozen and we were staring into the economic abyss.

So it’s crucial to avoid disorderly bank collapses, just as it’s crucial to avoid out-of-control urban fires.
There he goes again, parroting the Wall Street line that "we let Lehman fail and then look what happened after that." I hate to say it, folks, but had the Bush administration "saved" Lehman, we still would have had a huge mess. It was not the failure of Lehman per se that created the temporary Big Freeze on Wall Street, but rather the hard fact that the entire financial industry was infected by the toxic mortgage securities that had become the basis for a lot of financial pyramid schemes.

Likewise, had the Hoover administration and the Federal Reserve System "saved" the banks by flooding them with newly-printed money, as Krugman insists should have been the case, the economy still would have imploded. The problem was not lack of action by the federal government, but rather that the financial system that was undergirded by the Fed was inherently unstable. Furthermore, the new regulation initiatives pushed by Krugman and the Democrats really does not address the larger problem that comes when banks are permitted to engage in something akin to Bernie Madoff's Ponzi fraud.

(In this wonderful speech in which he addresses a number of issues Krugman has raised, Peter Schiff says, tongue-in-cheek, that given Madoff's financial practices, he should have been made Secretary of the Treasury.)

Instead, Krugman envisions a regulatory scheme that is a repeat of what existed before 1980, but now brings the brokerage houses and investment banks into the mix:
Since the 1930s, we’ve had a standard procedure for dealing with failing banks: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has the right to seize a bank that’s on the brink, protecting its depositors while cleaning out the stockholders. In the crisis of 2008, however, it became clear that this procedure wasn’t up to dealing with complex modern financial institutions like Lehman or Citigroup.

So proposed reform legislation gives regulators “resolution authority,” which basically means giving them the ability to deal with the likes of Lehman in much the same way that the F.D.I.C. deals with conventional banks. Who could object to that?
Well, I would object to it for the very reason that I believe that what we would have would be just a larger cartel, but a cartel that would behave exactly the way that cartels behave: cut back production, fund projects that are politically, not economically viable, and make sure there is no financial innovation in the system. Furthermore, the scheme Krugman is pushing does nothing to eliminate the moral hazard in the system, and he knows it. His solution? Let the regulators decide what should be financed, as they always make the right decisions (if they are Democrats, are "smart" and "believe in government.")

Of course, there is the obligatory slap at Reagan, claiming that it was he who gave us financial deregulation when, in fact, the major initiatives began when Jimmy Carter was president and the Democrats enjoyed larger majorities in Congress than they have now. That is the hyper-partisan Krugman at work, but it is falsification of the historical record, and deliberate falsification at that.

Now, Krugman is correct. We can have financial cartels and they will be relatively stable -- at least for a while -- but because the man has absolutely no knowledge of regulation (except he believes in it, provided regulators are Democrats, are "smart" and "believe in government") and apparently knows nothing about the huge volume of academic and popular literature on what really happens in regulatory schemes, he gets it wrong in the end.

The banking cartel whose passing he laments did not come to an end because Ronald Reagan dreamed of free markets. It ended because that cartel could not and would not finance a number of new entrepreneurial initiatives that have marked our economy for the last 30 years. Much of what has driven modern life, from telecommunications to computers to discount retailing came about because these initiatives were financed outside the banking cartel. The pressure to "let the banks compete" came not from Reagan but from the bankers themselves, along with Democrats like Alfred Kahn, who saw the real limitations that the New Deal-era regulations were imposing upon the economy.

Unfortunately, Krugman wants us to forget that in 1980 -- before Reagan even received the Republican nomination for president -- the economy was suffering from high unemployment AND double-digit inflation. Banks were losing capital because of the regulatory restrictions, and we had government-created and enforced cartels in railroads, trucking, finance and telecommunications. It was the Democrats that saw the problems this regime was creating and worked to do something about them.

As always happens in the political realm, the deregulation initiatives turned into schemes to help finance politicians, and whenever an industry, like high-tech, did not give enough political contributions, Congress encouraged anti-trust authorities to move in and make threats, as what happened in the Microsoft prosecutions of the late 1990s. Krugman really does not recognize that situation, nor do I believe that he is capable of understanding it, as his hyper-partisan ideology and his Keynesianism prevent him from absorbing an education in simple economics.

Thus, Krugman's "solution" is just to create an even larger cartel by bringing in the politically-connected brokerage houses and investment banks, but that just is setting up the economy for another crisis, just like what we had in 1980. Krugman, however, does not worry about that problem. Like the economist stranded on a desert island who decided to "assume" a feast was spread before him, Krugman simply "assumes" that government-created cartels will solve all of our economic problems. History tells us something different, but that does not matter. Krugman "assumes" a different history than what really happened.

Monday, April 12, 2010

Regulate Inflation? I Don't Think So!

In the past, I have said that Paul Krugman is a one-trick pony: his answer to everything is for the government to print more dollars. Indeed, in a recent article, Peter Schiff took apart Krugman's rewriting of U.S. financial history, noting that after World War II, contra Krugman, the U.S. Government reduced expenditures. (Burton Folsom in this article notes that, contra Krugman, the post-WWII U.S. Government also cut tax rates across-the-board, which Krugman considers to be a Great Sin.)

However, I need to give Krugman more credit, for he is not really a one-trick pony, but a one-and-a-half trick pony. What do I mean? I will explain, using Krugman's NYT April 12 column.

Writing about the high rate of bank failures in Georgia, compared to the relative stability in Texas, Krugman writes that in most cases, the high rates of foreclosures tended to be concentrated in areas with strict zoning laws. He writes:
To appreciate Georgia’s specialness, you need to realize that the housing bubble was a geographically uneven affair. Basically, prices rose sharply only where zoning restrictions and other factors limited the construction of new houses. In the rest of the country — what I once dubbed Flatland — permissive zoning and abundant land make it easy to increase the housing supply, a situation that prevented big price increases and therefore prevented a serious bubble.
Now, this would seem to be a case of the Law of Unintended Consequences rearing its head, since all good "Liberals" like Krugman are staunch supporters of strict zoning laws, but that fact seems to have escaped the Nobel Prize laureate. Instead, Krugman claims that he has found the magic bullet that tells us why Texas does not have the same kind of banking crisis that has hit Georgia:
So what’s the matter with Georgia? As I said, banks went wild, in a scene strongly reminiscent of the savings-and-loan excesses of the 1980s. High-flying bank executives aggressively expanded lending — and paid themselves lavishly — while relying heavily on “hot money” raised from outside investors rather than on their own depositors.

It was fun while it lasted. Then the music stopped.

Why didn’t the same thing happen in Texas? The most likely answer, surprisingly, is that Texas had strong consumer-protection regulation. In particular, Texas law made it difficult for homeowners to treat their homes as piggybanks, extracting cash by increasing the size of their mortgages. Georgia lacked any similar protections (and the Bush administration blocked the state’s efforts to restrict subprime lending directly). And Georgia suffered from the difference.
It is hard to examine this point in a short column, and I don't know how much Georgia's banking laws differ from those in Texas, although the ultimate irony to me is that George W. Bush was governor of Texas before coming to the White House, which, according to Krugman, generally makes that state to be evil. Nonetheless, I will take Krugman's word for it that Texas has stricter banking regulations than does Georgia (although the devil always is in the details and I suspect that the differences between Georgia and Texas are more cloudy than what Krugman tells us).

Thus, Krugman, reasons, the key to financial reform is regulation:
So what’s the moral of this story? As I see it, it’s a caution against silver-bullet views of reform, the idea that cracking down on just one thing — in particular, breaking up big banks — will solve our problems. The case of Georgia shows that bad behavior by many small banks can do as much damage as misbehavior by a few financial giants.

And the contrast between Texas and Georgia suggests that consumer protection is an essential element of reform. By all means, let’s limit the power of the big banks. But if we don’t also protect consumers from predatory lending, there are plenty of smaller players — both small banks and the nonbank “mortgage originators” responsible for many of the worst subprime abuses — that will step in and fill the gap.
Thus, on one side, Krugman readily support policies of inflation and having the Federal Reserve System artificially hold down interest rates. In other words, Krugman believes our government actively should push easy money.

However, on the other hand, he also wants government to determine who receives the new money through aggressive regulation. To put it another way, he wants the government simultaneously to make water flow downhill and uphill at the same time. That dog won't hunt, people.

Krugman seems to be the last economist who does not understand the "Capture Theory of Regulation," which was established long ago in the formal and informal economics literature. Instead, Krugman wants us to believe that as long as the regulatory offices are filled with "smart and well-meaning" apostles of financial regulation, then everything will be fine.

To put it another way, he believes that the same government (or at least government run by experts like him) that turns on the inflation spigots also is so wise that it can tell us exactly where that inflation should be direction, thus bringing happiness and prosperity to all. I don't think so.

All this reminds me of some parents in Chattanooga who rented a racetrack for their children to have a wild party after graduation. Their justification was that the kids were going to be drinking, anyway, so at least they could "regulate" the fallout from the party.

So, while their kids were getting stinkin' drunk, the parents patted themselves on the back for keeping their children from driving afterward. Likewise, Krugman believes that the government should supply Wall Street with endless amounts of financial "liquor," but that the regulators will keep everyone from getting drunk.

Tuesday, April 6, 2010

Some Comments on Recent Krugman Posts

According to Paul Krugman "textbook economics" teaches that in a recession, it is the duty of government to spend. Thus, when Michael Barone writes that the recent federal "aid" to state government mainly benefited unionized government employees, Krugman and the New Republic are all over this point, despite the fact that Barone is correct.

Krugman praises Jonathan Chait's attack on Barone, as Chait claims Barone is promoting "Hoovernomics." Writes Chait:
Sine (sic) it's pretty clear that Barone does not understand the theory he's arguing against, let me sum it up. Keynesian economics suggests that, in a severe recession, the government wants to pump demand into the economy through deficit spending. The federal government does this in part through "automatic stabilizers" -- during a recession, the decline in income and profits decreases tax revenue, and the increased need for food stamps, jobless benefits and other programs increases. States, however, are required to balance their budgets. Since revenues are falling and expenditures rising automatically, this forces them to cut spending and/or raise taxes automatically just to stay level. In other words, state fiscal policy has a large pro-cyclical effect, deepening the recession. The states lay off police officers, and then those officers stop going out to eat, forcing the local restaurant to lay off waitresses. Etc.

The purpose of providing aid to state and local governments is to help soften the pro-cyclical effect. Even with that aid, state government jobs have decreased by 5%, and local government jobs by 4%, over the last year.

The ideal fiscal policy during a massive economic crisis would be to temporarily increase the number of government employees, in order to soak up some of the enormous slack in the labor market. Mainstream economists believe aid to state and local governments is one of the most efficient ways to stimulate the economy. (But -- a ha! -- many economists work for universities, which are part of the public sector, so obviously they're trying to pay off the public employee unions, too.)
Well, Houston, we have a problem. First, Barone clearly is NOT advocating "Hoovernomics," since Herbert Hoover was the first president in U.S. history to have the federal government massively intervene in a downturn. (Chait believes that Hoover was a True Believer in free markets and did nothing, which means he has not read Murray Rothbard's book, America's Great Depression. Not that he really cares about the truth, anyway.)

Second, Barone is correct. The "textbook economics" really is Keynesian "economics," and just because a textbook tells us that government can bring prosperity by spending lots of money does not make it so. Chait and Krugman are people who seem to believe that government can create wealth by printing money. Not so. (According to Keynesians, government prints money and then wealth magically appears, which really is something akin to Harry Potter, not reality.)

As for Krugman's other column, "Me and the Bubble," he makes the point that the government should both artificially hold down interest rates and then regulate where the new money is going.

This is most interesting. Why does government hold down interest rates below market levels unless it wishes to subsidize those economic entities that are substandard? Yet, regulation is supposed to prevent substandard investments. So, on one end, Krugman wants people who are not creditworthy to have credit, but he just does not want them to be able to use that credit anywhere. That does not compute.

Krugman and his "Bubblicious" Advice

Poor Paul Krugman is on the defensive again. The "haters" are out there, and they are accusing him of promoting a housing bubble. Krugman, of course, is innocent of such bad conduct. He gives only good advice.

Since Krugman's latest crusade has been "financial reform," some people are reminding the Great Man of some words he wrote in 2002 when he was predicting a double-dip recession. Here is the controversial "bubble" paragraph:
The basic point is that the recession of 2001 wasn't a typical postwar slump, brought on when an inflation-fighting Fed raises interest rates and easily ended by a snapback in housing and consumer spending when the Fed brings rates back down again. This was a prewar-style recession, a morning after brought on by irrational exuberance. To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a snapback; it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do that, as Paul McCulley of Pimco put it, Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.
I tend to agree with Krugman that he was not promoting such a bubble, but rather was saying that the only way to ratchet up the kind of spending that Keynesians believed would end the recession was for Greenspan to create a housing boom. However, the next paragraph demonstrates that even Krugman did not realize that a bubble really was possible:
Judging by Mr. Greenspan's remarkably cheerful recent testimony, he still thinks he can pull that off. But the Fed chairman's crystal ball has been cloudy lately; remember how he urged Congress to cut taxes to head off the risk of excessive budget surpluses? And a sober look at recent data is not encouraging.
Interestingly, Krugman attacks Bush for pushing a tax-rate cut even though one of the Keynesian "solutions" to a recession is for government to cut taxes. Well, I guess Keynesians are happy only when the proper political party does the cutting.

Unfortunately, Krugman really gets it wrong when he denies that the Federal Reserve System's practice of holding down interest rates to artificially-low levels was foolish policy. Again, Krugman in his own words:
But did I call for low interest rates? Yes. In my view, that’s not what the Fed did wrong. We needed better regulation to curb the bubble — not a policy that sacrificed output and employment in order to limit irrational exuberance.
Here is the problem. The housing boom occurred not only because the government shoved interest rates down to ridiculously-low levels, but also because the government aggressively promoted policies of home ownership. Greenspan himself was pushing the kinds of interest-only, teaser-rate mortgages that ultimately exploded and triggered a wave of foreclosures.

The only kind of regulation that would have kept the housing bubble from happening was the regulation that violated the government's stated policies of promoting home ownership, not to mention dealing with the demands from the political Left that people be able to have "affordable housing." How Krugman thinks that we could have had effective regulation in this situation is beyond me.

Unfortunately, Krugman really is not capable of a serious thought when it comes to regulation. Instead, he depends upon the politically-infantile "Democrats are good regulators, Republicans don't believe in Regulation" nonsense. Economists such as the late George Stigler, Sam Pelzman, Robert Tollison, Gary Becker, and Bruce Yandle actually have done real work in regulation, and they approach the subject like adults.

Friday, April 2, 2010

Financial Reform 201

Now that ObamaCare has become law, Paul Krugman now is agitating for "financial reform," once again creating straw men, giving us a picture of the regulatory history of finance that is not true, and proposing "solutions" that only will lead to more problems. Other than that, I guess he will offer sound advice.

On the surface, all of us can agree. The financial meltdown on Wall Street came about because huge numbers of "investments," hedge funds, and other financial devices were pyramided atop securitized mortgages, which were being sold as though they were gold, instead of the fools gold they really were. To many people, it was obvious that this whole scheme was unsustainable, and when it went down, it went down quickly and very hard.

(In 2006, when I was appealing a tax ruling on my house, I told an Allegany County tax board that the housing market was, in fact, a bubble that would burst violently. They laughed at me, and one person said, "We don't see that happening." I replied that it would -- and it did.)

It is not hard to see in hindsight what happened. However, Krugman and I disagree on a large number of particulars, and one of them is the role of regulation in this mess, and the other is, well, the role of regulation needed to fix it.

Now, I agree with most (but not all) of what he writes here:
It’s easy to see where concerns about banks that are “too big to fail” come from. In the face of financial crisis, the U.S. government provided cash and guarantees to financial institutions whose failure, it feared, might bring down the whole system. And the rescue operation was mainly focused on a handful of big players: A.I.G., Citigroup, Bank of America, and so on.

This rescue was necessary, but it put taxpayers on the hook for potentially large losses. And it also established a dangerous precedent: big financial institutions, we now know, will be bailed out in times of crisis. And this, it’s argued, will encourage even riskier behavior in the future, since executives at big banks will know that it’s heads they win, tails taxpayers lose. (Emphasis mine)
He is correct about the moral hazard in the system, but the bailout was not necessary; in fact, it has blocked the needed liquidation of bad assets in the system and it is preventing a recovery from happening. Here we see the huge gulf between the Keynesians (and Friedmanites, for that matter) and the Austrians.

To a Keynesian, all assets pretty much are homogeneous, and what really matters is spending. Consumption is little more than people "buying back the products they make" in order to keep the Circular Flow intact. Thus, throwing more money into the economy via borrowing and printing will keep the economy from falling into the pit of deflation and helping set the stage for a recovery. To a Keynesian, the worst thing that can happen in deflation, for it creates an endless downward spiral that ends at an "equilibrium" of high unemployment and hopelessness.

(Robert Murphy in his Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression has a good commentary on this error. He points out that if this were true, then the Federal Reserve System's tightening of money in 1921 would have thrown the economy into a pit from which it would not have emerged. Instead, the economy soon afterward had a robust recovery.)

Austrians take a different tact. First, consumption is a purposeful activity, done by people to meet their needs and desires. Second, the basis of consumption is production; we consume because we produce, and we pay for consumption by exchanging what we have produced for those goods and services we need.

This implies that there is a balance within the economy that must be sustained. The housing meltdown came about because the go-go housing market could not continue, as the pouring of resources into housing pulled the entire system out of balance. Unfortunately, too many economists have claimed that the housing meltdown came about because housing prices fell (Martin Feldstein comes to mind here); no, prices fell because this market could not be sustained no matter how much money the government and the banks threw into it.

In other words, the Keynesians and Friedmanites have made the fundamental error of violating what Carl Menger called the Law of Cause and Effect. They have assumed that the effect really was the cause of the calamity. Furthermore, they continue to demand "solutions" that only prop up the malinvestments -- at the expense of the rest of the economy, the still-healthy portion that will not be healthy much longer if the government continues its path of borrowing, printing money, and propping up the bad investments.

I do agree with Krugman that the moral hazard problem is real, but I disagree with his proposed "solutions" that really only compound the problem. What he proposes is to bring back the banking regulations that existed from the New Deal to the early 1980s, and then putting the rest of the financial system under the same regulatory umbrella. In his view, cited elsewhere, "smart" and "well-meaning" regulators can take over from there and keep calamities from happening.

Before going further, I agree with Krugman that moral hazard was a huge problem and I also agree that under the current mentality that grips the system today, the bankers and financial barons invariably will be successful in asking for new money to clean up the mess they have made. However, Krugman also forgets that the establishment of the Fed in and of itself was a huge moral hazard. The original purpose of the central bank was to be a backstop that would provide newly-printed money to member banks in case of a run or a "panic," which occurred once in a while. The presence of the Fed sent a signal to the bankers that the government had their backs, and that problem continues to this day.

There is another issue I have noted before, and that is the difference between Krugman's view of where regulated banking stood in 1980 and the view of Austrians and others. According to Krugman, the banking cartel (which it really was) was doing just fine, but ideological Reaganites came in and undid the whole carefully and wisely-planned structure, all in the name of ideology. Then they created an entire shadow system, also done from ideology.

In a word, that view is nonsense. The banking cartel was losing capital because the government held down interest rates it could offer depositors even while inflation raged in double-digits. People sought other venues and found them. In the meantime, Michael Milken already was helping to finance ventures that the banks would not touch. (As Daniel Fischel notes in Payback, much of the recovery of the 1980s came from Milken's financing methods.)

As economists such as George Stigler and Sam Peltzman pointed out, regulation has the effect of offering protection to regulated firms, but also serving to keep out competitors. In other words, contra Krugman, regulation creates what in effect are government-sponsored cartels. From this, we see "Capture Theory" emerging, as the regulated industries and their government regulators form a tag team that operates to the benefit of the people in the system -- and against consumers.

The ultimate irony is that Krugman and others are demanding re-regulation as a form of "consumer protection," which clearly has not been the pattern of regulation. Krugman can deny this point, but he is the one who is wrong.

Krugman can provide this fantasy of regulation all he wants, and I am sure that plenty of people will believe it, but that does not change the fact that "Capture Theory" is real and provides a much stronger view of regulation than does Krugman's Keynesianism. The re-regulation he espouses not only will make the economy weaker (as it protects the current set of malinvestments), but it also sets the stage for crises in the future.

Instead, we need to abolish the government backstops altogether and stop this bailout foolishness, which only provides the economic agony we are experiencing. The problem is not "too big to fail" or "we need more regulation." No, what we need is to clear the moral hazard out of the system and let the economic assets move to their real values.

Only then will we have a real recovery.

Thursday, April 1, 2010

Sorry, Ben, You Did It Again

In this blog post, Paul Krugman quotes a Ben Bernanke speech of 2002 and then comes up with, frankly, a bizarre conclusion.

Here is a quote from Bernanke's speech (and the quote, historically speaking, is wrong):
It was in large part to improve the management of banking panics that the Federal Reserve was created in 1913. However, as Friedman and Schwartz discuss in some detail, in the early 1930s the Federal Reserve did not serve that function. The problem within the Fed was largely doctrinal: Fed officials appeared to subscribe to Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s infamous ‘liquidationist’ thesis, that weeding out “weak” banks was a harsh but necessary prerequisite to the recovery of the banking system. Moreover, most of the failing banks were small banks (as opposed to what we would now call money-center banks) and not members of the Federal Reserve System. Thus the Fed saw no particular need to try to stem the panics.
Krugman then declares:
The point is that breaking up the big players, then saying that it’s OK to let banks fail because no one player is crucial to the system is not a solution.
Uh, this is a non sequitur (a favorite argumentation tool that Krugman uses time and again), and really is head-scratching. One of the arguments for breaking up large banks has been that if they are "too big to fail," then they need bailing out, which causes lots of problems.

However, Krugman goes on, even if we break up the banks and then make them "not to big to fail," nonetheless, we should bail out those banks, too. This does not compute, people. If we are supposed to bail out banks no matter how big they are, then the original doctrine of breaking up banks is unnecessary. (Actually, I don't subscribe to the "too big to fail" doctrine, but since Krugman does, I figured I would challenge him on his own ground.)

Throughout the speech, Bernanke acts as though the only player in this whole affair was the Federal Reserve System, as though President Herbert Hoover's massive interventions did not happen. (My guess is that Bernanke, like Krugman, believes that Krugman actually followed Andrew Mellon's "liquidation" advice and did nothing. That is not true, no matter how many times these guys claim it is.)

However, Bernanke saves the best for last. In his speech, he closes with this:
For practical central bankers, among which I now count myself, Friedman and Schwartz's analysis leaves many lessons. What I take from their work is the idea that monetary forces, particularly if unleashed in a destabilizing direction, can be extremely powerful. The best thing that central bankers can do for the world is to avoid such crises by providing the economy with, in Milton Friedman's words, a "stable monetary background"--for example as reflected in low and stable inflation.

Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.
Bernanke is right, and even more right than he realizes. Indeed, the Fed's actions of holding down interest rates and fueling not only the stock market bubble of a decade ago, but also the disastrous housing bubble truly does demonstrate that "destabilizing" actions by central banks can bring financial calamity, and we are living that right now.

However, this is not what Bernanke means. No, he means that the Fed did not "inflate" enough from 1929 to 1933, and he would not make that "mistake" again. And he has not, and the calamity grows worse.

Unfortunately, the Austrian paradigm, while explaining this downturn perfectly, is not popular among the "elite" economists, who really want to believe that if they crank up the printing presses and borrow money until the cows come home, they can beat this downturn via government spending. That "solution" never has worked, and it never will work. Bernanke has done it again, just as his predecessors 80 years ago had done. And, just like his Fed forebears, he never will understand the damage he has done and will continue to do.

Monday, March 29, 2010

Folly and "Financial Reform," Part II

In Paul Krugman's column on "financial reform," he makes it sound so simple. Just put, smart, "well-meaning" regulators in power, and they will make sure that the financial system will work just fine.

Unfortunately, while Krugman understands the technical jargon about finance, he really does not comprehend the economics behind it. According to Krugman, government regulators can pick "winners" just as well as anyone else can do, and since capital itself, economically speaking, is homogeneous, well it is pretty easy to run an economy. Just let the regulators decide where the loans shall go, and there won't be any risk, and the economy will work like a clock.

This is fantasy. If government regulators really could pick winners, as Krugman seems to think, then people that wise immediately would be hired by investment firms -- at many times their government salaries -- and lead Wall Street firms into investment bliss. In truth, reality is much more complicated.

If the world Krugman still champions were in existence now, I would not be writing this piece, as laptops -- if they existed at all -- would be much more primitive than they are now. Forget about the Internet, since copper wire still would be transporting telephone calls, and the Internet as we know it could not exist under such technology.

Television would continue to be the dreadful fare of a few network stations, Dan Rather still would be on the air (since there would have been no bloggers to expose his dishonest use of forged documents in a diatribe against President George W. Bush), and the only way to be able to read Krugman would be if one purchased a paper edition of the New York Times. That is because the "shadow" system Krugman so despises, was the system that financed most of the high-technology ventures that have become an integral part of our lives.

Someone like Krugman cannot understand this because in his world, economic outcomes depend only upon how much money the government is willing to print. Whether or not the financial system operated under 1930s rules or if investors were free to pursue the new technologies would lead to exactly the same outcomes, at least where what was available to consumers is concerned.

In other words, Krugman has no concept of the Law of Cause and Effect. To him, the effect always is the same, economically speaking. However, to Austrian economists, the Law of Cause and Effect is front-and-center in understanding economic outcomes.

Austrians understand that the banking system Krugman so praises could not and would not have financed what turned out to be a massive economic recovery during the 1980s. That role was left to the "shadow" system.

Now, most of the deregulation initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s really was re-regulation, and the system became increasingly skewed, as politicians sought to maximize political contributions coming from the financial sector. Unwise laws like Sarbanes-Oxley limited possibilities of profit within our borders, so banks and brokerage houses turned to other means to make money.

While it is easy to decry a lack of oversight when the financial system went ga-ga over what turned out to be toxic mortgage securities, in hindsight, we realize that had the politicians not deliberately shackled the productive U.S. economy, perhaps banks and brokerage houses might have pursued more sound "investments" than pyramiding funds atop mortgage securities that turned out to be worthless.

Furthermore, Krugman forgets that the loose credit policies of the Federal Reserve System helped to trigger reckless lending and touched off an unsustainable boom. (Krugman does not believe booms are unsustainable. He just believes that if a boom slows down, government needs to print lots of money to keep the party going.)

Now, I agree with Krugman that the banks and brokerage houses were irresponsible, but one does not forget that people who believe that the government "has their backs" are going to be more reckless than people who understand that if they fail, they have to pick up their own pieces. Krugman never seems to fathom that the moral hazard created by the government backstops ultimately set the stage for this disaster. Nor is he ever going to change his tune; it's his story and he is sticking with it. I'll stick by my account.

Folly and "Financial Reform", Part I

In my review in the Freeman of Paul Krugman's The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (a book that I am requiring for my MBA students this spring) I noted that he made some insightful observations and comments. However, I continued, he then draws all of the wrong conclusions:
...alas, in the end Krugman resorts to the arguments of the great economic cranks of history, from Silvio Gesell to John Maynard Keynes. He’s like the mechanic who expertly describes a problem with your fuel pump—then insists your car needs more gas. If the tank is full, he tells you to attach an auxiliary tank.

In other words, Krugman is still the one-trick pony featured in the Times. Whatever the problem, his solution is always the same: inflation.
Thus it is today with his column on financial reform.Krugman correctly notes that the financial sector took risks that clearly were out-of-bounds, yet they also understood that the government had their backs. All of us can agree on that point, but the next question is where we part: Now that the financial meltdown has happened, what should we do about it?

Austrian economists like me believe that we need to move entirely away from a financial sector backed up by the printing presses of the U.S. Government and the monetary manipulations of the Federal Reserve System. Such a system always is doomed to failure because the symbiotic relationship between the financial sector and government is inevitable when government agents can descend on that sector and overnight change outcomes.

(The predations of Elliot Spitzer and Rudy Giuliani come to mind. While both men were effusively praised by Krugman's NYT employer, Wall Street got the message and gave both men massive amounts of campaign contributions. Like Willie Sutton, politicians know they can raid Wall Street because "that's where the money is.")

Krugman, on the other hand, approaches financial regulation from this point: Democrats always good, Republicans always bad. Democrats want wise regulation, Republicans want wild speculation. Now, that is something I expect to hear from political hacks or from Keith Olbermann, not to mention the editorial writers and columnists at the NYT.

I don't expect a decorated economist like Krugman to give in to this simplistic hackdom, and that is what he is doing, like it or not. Furthermore, he gives a skewed history of the rise of what he and others call the "shadow banking system."

In Krugman's history, the tightly-regulated banking system was almost impervious to failure because regulators kept it from going after Big Risks. Unfortunately, those bad free-market ideologues both created a shadow system and then bamboozled the Wise Government to deregulate the banking system, ultimately leading to the present crisis. That is a history that plays well to both his audience and the current crop of politicians in power.

As I said before, I expect to hear such nonsense from the Usual Suspects, just as I expect Ann Coulter to claim that Barack Obama is not pursuing Big, Bad Muslims around the globe with enough ferocity (and, thus, adding further to our government's financial bankruptcy). However, as economists have noted for decades, the real story of regulation is much more nuanced and requires for people not to give into partisan diatribes.

What Krugman does not tell us is that by 1980, the small, wonderful banking system was in crisis in no small part because of the regulation Krugman praises. Regulators operate according to a set of incentives in which they receive no credit for "picking winners" but are in hot water if they allow actions that result in failure. Therefore, the default for regulators always will be "no."

Ever hear of MCI? Of Borders Bookstore? Of McCaw (now AT&T) Cellular? Of CNN? Of fiber-optics and a thousand other high-technology initiatives? The reason you have heard of them has been that "shadow banking system" that Krugman condemns. The heavily-regulated banking system would not touch them because these were new ventures that were outside of the usual kinds of things (like government bonds) that banks were permitted to help finance.

Like the entrepreneurs in Elizabethan England who set up shop outside London (because the Queen had granted monopolies in that city to her favored people), something noted by economists Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison in their book Politicized Economies, the shadow financial system grew precisely because it allowed investors to pursue profitable opportunities that the regulated banking system could not.

Furthermore, the "tightly-regulated" banking system, which really was more of a regulated cartel, was losing capital. Part of the regulatory deal was that government would limit the risk the system could take, but it also would place ceilings on interest rates the banks could offer. At a time when inflation was in double-digits, but banks only could pay depositors something in the range of 6 percent, people flocked to money market accounts being offered by financial entrepreneurs that were relatively safe but also paid higher interest rates.

Like the entrepreneurs who broke down the Mercantilist regulatory system of post-Renaissance England simply by locating elsewhere, the financial entrepreneurs like Michael Milken helped to finance what would be our economic future for two decades. Of course, the established financial firms on Wall Street that were being left out of the action did not like upstarts like Milken, and so Rudy Giuliani did their dirty work, urged on by the NY Times and others.

(By the way, Milken was a liberal Democrat and hardly falls into the category of the "free-market, Republican ideologue" so demonized by Krugman and others. In other words, Milken did not fit the stock profile, but nonetheless was pushed into that false category anyway.)

The background being set, in Part II, I will look at Krugman's current statements and point out why they are wildly untrue and misleading.