Uh, Isn't this a Case of Malinvestment? I Forgot; Krugman Doesn't Believe in Malinvestment

A while back, Paul Krugman mocked the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT -- or ATBC), claiming it was akin to the "phlogiston theory of fire." Why would he use such terms? Because the ABCT is based on the view that government economic intervention -- and especially aggressive monetary intervention -- creates malinvestments that cannot be sustained, and every good Keynesian knows that the real problem is "aggregate demand."

Thus, to get an economy quickly back on track after a bout of poor aggregate demand, all that is needed is for a government to engage in aggressive spending, borrowing, creating inflation (when the economy is in a "liquidity trap"), and creating vast subsidies in order to ramp up more spending. Krugman has emphasized these points time and again the past four years, and they are part-and-parcel to Keynesian doctrines.

Yet, in his most recent column, Krugman tries to claim that a financial crisis is "different" from other business cycle downturns because it takes longer for the economy to recover. Yet, to me, this brings up a number of questions that seem to contradict his Holy Keynesian Faith. He writes:

... President Obama’s people failed to appreciate something that is now common wisdom among economic analysts: severe financial crises inflict sustained economic damage, and it takes a long time to recover. (emphasis mine)

The simply question I ask is: Why? For that matter, given the Keynesian view that for analytical purposes factors of production are homogeneous, why should a housing bubble be a bad thing? (Oh, I forgot, the Federal Reserve System is trying to reflate the housing market and Krugman approves. That's called creating another bubble.)

If a housing bubble, or any other financial bubble, puts prices out kilter with fundamentals, why is that a problem given that Keynesian doctrine treats an economy simply as two curves, an aggregate demand curve and an aggregate supply curve? No matter what the government does as long as it encourages more demand is just fine.

Does Krugman believe this? No, or at least if he recognizes financial bubbles, then he also recognizes malinvestments, even if he claims otherwise. However, in looking at his infamous "Hangover Theory" article, there is a contradiction that Krugman never has tried to erase. He writes:

...let's ask a seemingly silly question: Why should the ups and downs of investment demand lead to ups and downs in the economy as a whole?

However, during both the Tech Bubble and the Housing Bubble, unemployment rates did go down and we had a general economic boom. (The Clintonistas claimed that they had created a "New Economy" by raising the top tax rate to 39.6 percent.) The booms were the trigger mechanism for much of the creation of new money and were central points of spending. Furthermore, the U.S. dollar was considered to be the world's "reserve currency," so when people were able to hold more dollars, the rest of the world was glad to accept them.

Even Krugman would acknowledge that point, but he has no intellectual theory to explain why it is that a housing bust and financial crisis should then result in long-term economic damage complete with high unemployment. His criticism of the ABCT could just as well be criticism of his own Keynesians beliefs:

The hangover theory, then, turns out to be intellectually incoherent; nobody has managed to explain why bad investments in the past require the unemployment of good workers in the present.

We could say the same thing about Keynesian Theory and Krugman's earlier point about financial collapses. If government simply takes over all lending and spends and spends and spends, then why should there be any residual problems at all? In fact, the government has done all of these things, yet the underlying economy is very weak. Krugman can try to play the political operative and spin the current mess as a huge success for the Obama administration, but he has not explained how a financial bubble (1) could help create a boom and (2) how a bursting of the bubble would cause damage given that government can fix things with spending.

Furthermore, if prices really don't matter (except aggregates put into an index), how would we know in the first place that a bubble had occurred? So what if housing prices are high; if the relationship of the prices don't really matter, then who is to say that housing is out-of-kilter? No doubt, these statements will enrage a Keynesian True Believer, but Keynesians -- including Krugman -- are not free to claim that prices matter when they want them to matter and that prices don't matter when Keynesians claim they don't.

Krugman Endorses Insanity (His Own Words)

On the Sunday before Thanksgiving in 2004, I attended a session at the Southern Economics Association annual meeting, held in New Orleans, and the speaker was Paul Krugman. Joseph Salerno and I sat next to each other to hear the Great Wisdom from The Master. To be honest, I cannot remember anything he said, but I do remember his answer to my question during the Q&A.

My question dealt with tax rates. I asked that since he was critical of the current tax setup, would he endorse the 70 percent rates that existed before 1981? "Oh, no!" he exclaimed, "Those rates were insane!"

Since that time, Krugman seems to be doing everything he can to endorse insanity, and he does it again today in a column that totally misses the mark on the issue of economic growth. To be honest, the question he seems to be raising is a fair one -- Can we have both strong economic growth and high marginal tax rates? -- but his view of economic growth is so skewed that one hardly can answer it on his terms.

He writes:

The first thing you need to know is that America wasn’t always like this. When John F. Kennedy was elected president, the top 0.01 percent was only about a quarter as rich compared with the typical family as it is now — and members of that class paid much higher taxes than they do today. Yet somehow we managed to have a dynamic, innovative economy that was the envy of the world. The superrich may imagine that their wealth makes the world go round, but history says otherwise.

He is correct in that in the early 1960s, the U.S. economy was still the strongest in the world even though its highest marginal rate was about 90 percent. Thus, he reasons, tax rates really don't matter and we can raise rate much higher than they are today and still have lots of economic growth. In past columns, he has noted that a number of key sectors such as rail, truck, and air transportation all were organized into regulated cartels (though he does not use "cartels" even though that is what they were), and banking and finance were tightly organized into similar kinds of cartels. Things were so good back then, he argues, that any change in such legal arrangements could not have had any overall economic benefits and, in fact, the only reason things were changed was because people with the wrong ideology took power.

(Nowhere does Krugman acknowledge the Elephant In The Living Room. In 1961, the other economies of the world were recovering from that destruction of World War II. Japan's economy was in its infancy of productivity, Great Britain had moved to socialism and stagnation, Eastern Europe was walled off by the U.S.S.R., most of Asia was still in its ancient agricultural mode. The U.S. economy was in a position that would be changing, even if Krugman refuses to acknowledge that simple fact.)

Krugman seems to be saying that since this arrangement seemed to be successful in 1961, it ALWAYS would be successful, and he also seems to hint that the economy was successful BECAUSE of the tax and regulatory environment. For Krugman, it is post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Thus, if we were to return to such arrangements, we could then emulate the success of that era.

This brings me to the subject of his column, and that is his discussion of "the rich." If I read Krugman correctly, he is saying that Mitt Romney and his supporters are claiming that those who are wealthy really are the "engines" of a market economy, and that to raise taxes on them would stifle economic growth. Those supporters, Krugman, argues, are wrong because we had high marginal rates before along with economic growth.

Unfortunately, Krugman's entire analysis is based upon a very typical Keynesian "snapshot" view of the economy in which, to quote Robert Higgs, the individual factors of the economy are treated as just "goo" in which the only relevant analysis is to use pure aggregates. This has much political usefulness, as one can see, for Krugman does not have to deal with long-term trends or any underlying weaknesses within the economy. Furthermore, in his views, changes to the legal and regulatory structure have nothing to do with problems that  came about because of the structures of incentives and relationships created by tax laws and regulation. Instead, any changes to what had been a near-perfect system came about ONLY because of "conservative ideology."

Notice a word that never appears in any of Krugman's columns; never. It is "entrepreneurship." I have come to believe that Krugman thinks than an economy is totally administrative and very mechanistic: producers know the production function and then they produce things based upon their projections of how future spending patterns will go. The only things needed for a "successful" economy, then, are productions functions and spending.

The Krugman Economy is one in which economic growth would be due to changes in technology (and government researchers can "invent" anything that is necessary and innovative) and spending, lots of spending. Markets are useful only if they fit the pattern of "perfect competition" in which each firm is tiny and it faces a horizontal demand curve. Firms are simple production functions with given cost curves, with the sole decision by managers being where to set output.

Since entrepreneurship really is not necessary in the Krugman Economy, anyone who gains wealth via entrepreneurial activities is no different than a person who has inherited wealth, like the Kennedys. High marginal tax rates would have no effect upon production or wealth creation, since a government-run firm would be just as productive as a private one and probably more socially useful, since government agents and regulators -- at least if they are Democrats -- always govern with the best of intentions, and everyone know that intentions are all that matters. (Thus, if government agents intend to have high-quality "universal" medical care, then such a program is both morally superior to anything else and also will have the intended results.)

In the Krugman Economy, a Steven Jobs is no more useful than someone living in the Hamptons who lives off a huge trust fund, with the only real social use of either being the potential for government to take large portions of their incomes via taxation, which then can be converted into government spending, which is the REAL source of economic growth. There are no such things as incentives; corporations and entrepreneurs will not change their behavior or outlook a whit if the top rates go back up to 90 percent. Like the band in "Animal House," they will continue to march forward even if a wall blocks their way.

As I see it, Krugman argues that high tax rates will not hurt economic growth because entrepreneurs are both economically and socially unnecessary. He has not gone as far as John Kenneth Galbraith, who argued that entrepreneurs were parasites because they produced useless "private" goods that took away from "needed public investment," although is clearly is in Galbraith's neighborhood.

I would argue that Krugman is much closer to the views of his former professor, Paul Samuelson, who depended solely upon GDP models which permitted him to claim that the planned economy of the former Soviet Union was superior to that of a market economy because the U.S.S.R.'s aggregate numbers showed high growth. That the economy of the U.S.S.R. was primitive, blocked by massive shortages, poor quality of goods, and outright idiocy. Instead, people like Samuelson look at the overall production of goods, such as automobiles and then assumed that, for the purposes of economic analysis, a clunky, 1948-style East German Wartburg was no different than the superior cars made in the West and in Japan. All that mattered were aggregates.

Since entrepreneurship in the old communist bloc economies was illegal and those economies were growing rapidly, Samuelson and his followers reasoned that entrepreneurship at best was a dinosaur, historically interesting but unneeded in the modern, "sophisticated" economies in which wise planners armed with MIT doctorates could run via the creation and solving of simultaneous equations.

In a word, Krugman really does not understand the role of the entrepreneur, nor will he ever understand it. All he sees is someone with money who isn't spending enough of it at the present time. Furthermore, he cannot tell the difference between an entrepreneur and someone who lives on inherited wealth, nor can he tell the difference between market entrepreneurship and political entrepreneurship (i.e. Solyndra).

So, in the Wonderland of Krugman's economy, 90 percent tax rates make perfect sense. It might be "insanity," but in Wonderland, the insane is sane.

A couple of Krugman howlers

Every once in a while, Paul Krugman gives us the Ultimate Howlers, and today he seems to have eaten his Wheaties.

First, on Social Security, he says this:

I’ve written about this repeatedly in the past, but here it is again: Social Security is a program that is part of the federal budget, but is by law supported by a dedicated source of revenue. This means that there are two ways to look at the program’s finances: in legal terms, or as part of the broader budget picture.

In legal terms, the program is funded not just by today’s payroll taxes, but by accumulated past surpluses — the trust fund. If there’s a year when payroll receipts fall short of benefits, but there are still trillions of dollars in the trust fund, what happens is, precisely, nothing — the program has the funds it needs to operate, without need for any Congressional action.

Alternatively, you can think about Social Security as just part of the federal budget. But in that case, it’s just part of the federal budget; it doesn’t have either surpluses or deficits, no more than the defense budget.

Both views are valid, depending on what questions you’re trying to answer.

What you can’t do is insist that the trust fund is meaningless, because SS is just part of the budget, then claim that some crisis arises when receipts fall short of payments, because SS is a standalone program. (Emphasis mine)

Despite the claims by Algore when he was running for president 11 years ago that he would put SS funds in a "lockbox," there IS no "lockbox." The "trust fund" of what Krugman writes are government bonds, IOUs that only can be redeemed either by selling more bonds or with future tax revenues.

The vaunted "trust fund" is no trust fund at all. It is a piece of a fictitious Rob-Peter-to-Pay-Paul scheme that any one can recognized to be a fraud.

On another post, one about "weaponized Keynesianism" (and I actually like the phrase, which apparently was coined by Barney Frank, Krugman writes this:

The first thing to say is that liberals shouldn’t engage in mirror-image thinking, and imagine that spending we dislike somehow lacks the job-creating virtues of spending we like. Economics, as I say often, is not a morality play. As far as creating aggregate demand is concerned, spending is spending – public spending is as good as but also no better than private spending, spending on bombs is as good as spending on public parks. As I pointed out not long ago, a perceived threat of alien invasion, by getting us to spend on anti-invasion measures, would quickly restore full employment, even though the spending would be on totally useless object.

While I realize that Krugman is writing from a pure Keynesian point of view that says it is the spending and ONLY the spending that matters, it seems to me that where resources are directed DOES matter. During WWII, Americans had jobs and pockets full of money, but there was little to buy and a huge portion of the workforce was in the trenches in Europe and Asia or being shot out of the skies. Yes, the GDP was high, but Americans were not manufacturing wealth; it was destruction of wealth.

Again, I realize that Keynesians see only aggregates and that GDP making bombs is as good as GDP making bread. Frankly, I'd rather eat bread.

A "War on Demand" or a War on Reason?

In a recent blog post, Paul Krugman is all atwitter over what he perceives to be a "widespread attack on demand-side economics." Not surprisingly, in his defense of Keynesianism, he manages to launch his own misguided attack on anyone who might think that "aggregate demand" is not an economic concept.

He writes:

...we’re seeing a much more widespread attack on demand-side economics. More than that, it’s becoming clear that many people don’t so much disagree with the idea that demand matters as find it abhorrent, incomprehensible, or both. I fairly often get comments to the effect that I can’t possibly believe what I’m saying about monetary or fiscal policy, that no sensible person could believe that printing money or engaging in deficit spending will increase output and employment — never mind that all I’m saying is what Econ 101 textbooks have been saying for the last 62 years.

First, the fact that something might appear in a textbook -- even for 62 years -- does not make it correct. It seems that Krugman is taking a chapter out of the "market test" view of economics that the Chicago School has used in an attempt to discredit the Austrian School.

Krugman, like Keynes, bases his viewpoint on a misstatement of Say's Law, in which he presents a caricature of what J.B. Say wrote in his Chapter XV of Book I in A Treatise on Political Economy. He writes:

First, Keynes was right: Say’s Law — the notion that income must be spent, and hence that supply creates its own demand — really is at the heart of the issue. Many, many people just can’t see how it’s possible for there to be an overall shortfall of demand.

Number one, what Krugman writes is NOT Say's Law, not even close. It is what Krugman and others of his intellectual generation WANT Say's Law to proclaim, yet as one who has read this chapter many times and who published a paper a year ago on it, I can say that what Krugman has written is nonsense.

The chapter in question dealt with the very issues Krugman raises, although it was done more than 130 years before The General Theory was written. In Krugman's caricature, he misinterprets Say's chapter as being written to claim that "aggregate demand" always is sufficient to purchase everything that is produced, as though it is impossible for there to be what Thomas Malthus and others claimed would be a "glut of commodities" that would exist because people would not spend their income.

Say did not deny that there could be a "glut" at times; in fact, he addresses that very issue, beginning with a situation in which there are unsold goods and the economy seems to be in the tank. (This should be a tipoff to the intellectual dishonesty of Krugman's position; Say addresses the very thing that Krugman claims that Say claimed was impossible.)

What Say did argue, and what I have argued in the paper I linked, was that there could be proportional imbalances in the economy, that there would be -- at least temporarily -- "too much" of something produced (Housing bubble, anyone?) and simultaneously, too little of something else.

However, what Say does not do is to lay out the causes of such problems. In his chapter, he only addresses the pre-Keynes/Krugman argument that the problem is due to a lack of "aggregate demand" (they did not use that term in 1803) brought about by a lack of money or a "general overproduction."

The issue Say covered was the source of demand itself: production of goods that could be traded for other goods. Keynes, and later Krugman, would argue that because people are paid in money for producing things, and because they have a tendency to save (and especially the wealthy, which is why Krugman believes that they should be taxed at higher rates -- so government will spend that money), that the market system itself has an internal contradiction that always leads to the problem of overproduction/underconsumption.

Say demolishes that argument in his Chapter XV, and I would invite readers to look at it for themselves, as opposed to taking Krugman's interpretation as gospel. However, Krugman is not satisfied at just attacking that point of view. No, he has to claim that anyone who thinks J.B. Say had a good point is doing so because of irrational moral scruples:

It’s becoming clear to me that a substantial number of writers on economics find the whole idea that the economy can suffer because people are too thrifty, insufficiently willing to spend, deeply repugnant. I’m the sort of person who finds the notion that sometimes virtue is vice and prudence folly interesting; but it’s clear that a number of people find that notion just plain evil. The world shouldn’t be like that — and therefore it isn’t.

And so he continues:

It’s kind of shocking if you think about it. Here we have a huge, hard-won intellectual achievement, one that accounts very well for the world we actually see, and yet it’s being thrown away because it doesn’t go along with ideological preconceptions. Once that sort of thing starts, where does it stop? The next thing you know, the theory of evolution will get the same treatment. Oh, wait.

In other words, this is not an argument about the efficacy of savings versus investment or even the perceived role of "aggregate demand." No, it is an argument between the Smart People (like Krugman) and the Yahoos who are so stupid that they might even believe in Creationism, which every writer at the NY Times knows is a notion that only Really Stupid and Immorally-Ignorant People will embrace.

In other words, in the end, this isn't even an argument about economic theory. No, it is not worthy even of argument. Krugman is saying that those people who disagree with his Keynesian views are so ignorant and so lacking of any regard at all that it would be better for the world if they were not alive. And they certainly deserve not even to be in the presence of Krugman at all, unless, of course, they agree to be treated as people once regarded children: people to be seen but not heard.

Robert Higgs versus Paul Krugman

Because Paul Krugman is the most visible spokesman for the Keynesian economic viewpoint (or, at least what Robert Higgs calls "vulgar Keynesianism"), I tend to deal with his statements from the New York Times, as it is convenient to do so, and Krugman clearly does a good job of stating his viewpoints from there. (I tend to avoid statements by James Galbraith, which are like Krugman's, although Galbraith does not do as well in squeezing the concepts into small spaces.)

One prominent economist who also understands the modern Keynesian orthodoxy is Higgs, who edits the Independent Review and who has been an eloquent voice against what Krugman and others promoting. Today, I examine a couple of articles that Higgs wrote in which he clearly lays out why it is that Krugman's orthodoxy is destructive.

In this article published on Lew Rockwell's page almost a year ago, Higgs goes to the heart of the differences between the Austrians and the Keynesians, writing:

The root problem, I believe, lies in the aggregative character of contemporary thinking about macroeconomic fluctuations. In this view, rising aggregate real output is good, no matter what the composition of the newly produced goods and services. A recession, which most analysts understand as a sustained decline of aggregate real output, is bad, and, in their view, it should be combated by fiscal "stimulus" and by expansionary monetary policy in order to reverse the decline in aggregate demand. They do not worry about – indeed, they rarely even pay much attention to – the makeup of the aggregate output that is added during business expansions, lost during business recessions, or brought into being by the government's compensating fiscal and monetary actions. Output is output; spending is spending. In fact, the whole idea of using government spending to offset reduced spending by investors or consumers turns on this assumption that a dollar spent is a dollar spent, regardless of what it is spent for.

However, that thinking, writes Higgs, is wrong because of its insistence upon the homogeneity of investment and output:

In today's vulgar Keynesian environment, investors and economists do not appreciate how the seeds of macroeconomic busts are sowed by artificially created credit that is employed to finance investments that would not be undertaken if they had to be financed by real savings – investments known in economic theory as malinvestments. When a large volume of malinvestments has been undertaken during a boom (e.g., much of the investment in residential housing and commercial real-estate development between 2002 and 2006), and when for whatever reason the pace of new credit creation slows, causing interest rates to rise, then the unsustainability of these malinvestments becomes increasingly apparent. More and more of them are terminated, often in unfinished condition, and many such projects go bankrupt for want of buyers willing and able to pay for them in the market. (Emphasis Higgs')

A "recovery" created by such means is no recovery at all, as Higgs explains:

If the government and the central bank use their fiscal and monetary policies to prop up these malinvestments, they do not solve the basic problem; they only paper it over for the time being. The vast assistance given recently to financial institutions embarrassed by investments in bad real-estate-related securities, for example, has allowed these institutions to delay the write-offs and other balance-sheet adjustments that would reflect the errors they have made. The bailouts have created a large number of zombie financial institutions, much like the ones that caused the Japanese economy to stagnate during the 1990s and later. Owners and managers of financial firms laden with rotten securities have been holding out for government rescues of various sorts, rather than carrying out the required restructuring, which in many cases must include bankruptcy proceedings.

Just as the malinvestments were made possible in the first place by effusions of artificially created credit and hence artificially depressed interest rates, so now the Treasury and the Fed are keeping the owners of these malinvestments afloat by further effusions of artificially created credit. But so long as these inherently unsustainable projects continue, they constitute a huge legion of the living dead. They may look viable, but their viability hinges entirely on de facto subsidies via the government's various bailout schemes. Such projects will remain unsustainable unless continually propped up at the expense of the general public, who will suffer because of increased ordinary taxes or a mounting inflation tax on their dollar-denominated assets. If the government goes forward in this fashion, it will be sustaining an economy rife with malinvestments kept in operation only by constant transfusions of other people's wealth channeled to the zombie projects by the Treasury and the Fed – a permanent policy of robbing prudent, responsible Peter to pay imprudent, irresponsible Paul. No sound, long-run economic development can be based on such productivity-sapping transfers of wealth into projects that are not worth the expense of keeping them going and which misallocate resources to the overall economy's detriment so long as they continue.

In this article, published in March, 2009, Higgs goes into more detail explaining why the aggregation of economic activity into the Y = C + I + G + (X-M) equation is just plain wrong and ultimately destructive. Writes Higgs:

This way of compressing diverse, economy-wide transactions into single variables has the effect of suppressing recognition of the complex relationships and differences within each of the aggregates. Thus, in this framework, the effect of adding a million dollars of investment spending for teddy-bear inventories is the same as the effect of adding a million dollars of investment spending for digging a new copper mine. Likewise, the effect of adding a million dollars of consumption spending for movie tickets is the same as the effect of adding a million dollars of consumption spending for gasoline. Likewise, the effect of adding a million dollars of government spending for children’s inoculations against polio is the same as the effect of adding a million dollars of government spending for 7.62 mm ammunition. It does not take much thought to conceive of ways in which suppression of the differences within each of the aggregates might cause our thinking about the economy to go seriously awry.

In fact, “the economy” does not produce an undifferentiated mass we call “output.” Instead, the millions of producers who bring forth “aggregate supply” provide an almost infinite variety of specific goods and services that differ in countless ways. Moreover, an immense amount of what goes on in a market economy consists of dealings among producers who supply no “final” goods and services at all, but instead supply raw materials, components, intermediate products, and services to one another. Because these producers are connected in an intricate pattern of relations, which must assume certain proportions if the entire arrangement is to work effectively, critical consequences turn on what in particular gets produced, when, where, and how.

These extraordinarily complex micro-relationships are what we are really referring to when we speak of “the economy.” It is definitely not a single, simple process for producing a uniform, aggregate glop. Moreover, when we speak of “economic action,” we are referring to the choices that millions of diverse participants make in selecting one course of action and setting aside a possible alternative. Without choice, constrained by scarcity, no true economic action takes place. Thus, vulgar Keynesianism, which purports to be an economic model or at least a coherent framework of economic analysis, actually excludes the very possibility of genuine economic action, substituting for it a simple, mechanical conception, the intellectual equivalent of a baby toy.

Compare this to what Krugman claims: that all that is needed for the government to "create prosperity" is for the central banks to print money and the government to borrow and spend. Yet, the profession claims that Krugman is the better economist? Somehow, I doubt it.