The Fed and its Role in the Economy: No Conspiracies, Just Bad Policy

In the comment section of my last post, one of my critics identified as JG made a point that I believe truly highlights the differences between Keynesians and the Austrians:

@ Anderson,"The Fed wants to drive money toward those assets by keeping their prices artificially high..."

Is that really what the Fed's goal is? To keep prices high? Do you really believe that QE is really a conspiracy to inflate MBS prices?

Someone less given to conspiracy theories would assume that the Fed was buying MBS to maintain liquidity in the financial system to faciliate lending during a time of weak demand.

True, the commenter was trying to lump me in with conspiracy theorists who seem to believe that the Fed principals conspire to wreck the economy and that they know exactly what they are doing and that is part of their dastardly plan. Now, I would agree that a bad economy in which an increasing number of people become dependent upon the government is good for President Obama in particular and the Democratic Party in general, especially if people come to believe that their state of dependence exists because the government is not taxing others enough or if businesses are conspiring to destroy the economy. We certainly see a lot of that from the Democrat/Keynesian camp, which is not without conspiracy theories of its own.

If I might use somewhat simplistic  models that I believe do reflect the differences in thinking between Keynesians and Austrians, the differences are portrayed as followed:

Keynesians: They believe that a market economy is internally flawed and will hurdle toward underconsumption at every turn. Their underconsumption lynchpin (wild swings in private investment, depending upon the "animal spirits" of investors) differs from that of the Marxists (capitalist profits suck the purchasing power from the proletariat, which leads to internal collapses of capitalist economies), but the results are similar.

For example, the housing boom and bust was a product of a pure, unregulated (by government) market in which none of the government agencies had anything to do with the crisis, except that the animalistic capitalist spirit so infected every regulatory agency that none of the regulatory agents -- even those who had perfect foresight (since most government agents are blessed with such foresight if they are performing under a regime run by the Democratic Party) -- did anything to stop it. The capitalists refused to read any price signals and led the economy into the abyss, as pure, unregulated capitalism always does. Had government agents been properly regulating the directing the housing market, it would have performed perfectly.

The Keynesians believe that capitalists do not respond to price signals (which are overblown, anyway, since an actual economy does not replicate the mathematical models of perfect competition), and that prices are useful mostly in their aggregation into various price indices, which themselves are statistics, not points of economic analysis.On the production side, market economies are prone to slide into the scourge of being overrun by monopolies, which create income inequality when then exacerbates the downward slide even more. Thus, without government oversight, and without the presence of a central bank like the Fed along with various government spending mechanisms, a market economy will implode into a miserable abyss of high unemployment and underconsumption. If there is deflation -- which always looms within a market economy -- then the system automatically will plunge into depression and stay there, since in the real world, entrepreneurs don't respond to price signals, anyway.

The important point here is that the Fed, along with the government agencies, exist in order to respond to private market failures, which the capitalists create on their own, with capitalist failures always being systematic. The Fed and the government, then, do not create conditions that lead to mass unemployment (unless someone at the Fed believes in Austrian theories that will make the central bank raise interest rates and choke off aggregate demand), but rather exists to offset those private market failures.

I believe this has been a fair interpretation of the Keynesian position. I now turn toward the Austrians.

Austrians: They believe that market economies are internally stable, and that government interventions, such as the ones made by the Fed, not only are counterproductive but actually help cause the downturns in the first place. No one is blessed at any time with "perfect information," but a price system actually sends the information that entrepreneurs and managers need to make production and exchange decisions regarding the future. Not all people respond properly to price signals, but the errors tend to be random, not systematic.

Intervention by government is harmful because it creates perverse incentives and directs production away from lines that are sustainable into those lines of production which are not. For example, far from being a free-market failure, the housing boom occurred because government in the form of the Federal Reserve System and the various government agencies that are tied to housing engaged in activities that directed investment and spending toward housing in amounts that could not be sustained. Not only did the Fed push down interest rates that encouraged more home buying and refinancing than what would happen in a normal market (without the intervention), but government agencies especially aimed their programs toward the "sub-prime" market in which were created vast amounts of mortgage securities that sold at prices well beyond what would have been the case had the government not been targeting housing in the first place.

Now, it was Wall Street, with its politically-connected banks and financial houses, that created many of these securities (Freddie and Fannie being the other two entities) but one must remember that these banks did not act within the structure of free markets. Instead, their principals acted knowing that the infamous Greenspan/Bernanke "Put" existed in the background, and that even though the mortgage securities certificates clearly stated that they were not guaranteed by the government, in essence that was a mere formality, for the government stood by to do just that: bail out Wall Street.

The point that Austrians emphasize is that without the government intervention and the promise of bailouts, the banks would have been much more likely to have followed the price signals that the markets were sending and not have marched over the cliff. Government here was not an entity that followed in the wake of private disasters in order to clean up the mess, but rather government was actively taking part in creating the mess in the first place.

As for the post-crisis mess, Austrians believe that since government interventions set the stage for the collapse, doing more of the same will not rescue the economy. In fact, it simply continues the same mistakes that occurred in the first place.

In response to the comment that I see Bernanke's purchases of mortgage securities as some sort of sinister plot to undermine the recovery, that is nonsense. My criticism is not of Bernanke's motives, but rather his actions. He is not "preserving liquidity" or anything like that; instead, he is propping up securities that markets already have rejected and continues to direct resources into lines of production that are unsustainable.

Keynesians counter with the "idle resources" argument that states that in a depressed economy such as ours, there are "idle resources" that are made idle by a lack of aggregate demand. When government resorts to what essentially are financial tricks such as the Fed purchasing securities, it is doing nothing more than engaging in unorthodox actions that are needed at this particular time because of very specific conditions that for the most part don't exist, i.e. the "liquidity trap." Without those actions, the economy will plunge into the abyss of a miserable, high-unemployment steady state in which we will be mired forever.

The Austrian response is that many of the "idle resources" are idle because they were malinvestments. The market does not support them because the patterns of purchasing and preferences shown by consumers do not and cannot keep those resources unemployed. Instead, entrepreneurs guided by price signals and interest rates (that follow a natural rate of interest, not something set by the Fed) will move resources from lower to higher-valued uses.

At the base of the thinking, I believe we can say the following: Keynesians believe that a market is not self-correcting in the event of a downturn, while Austrians believe that it is. There really is no middle ground between the two lines of thinking, which is why we see the kinds of responses we observe on this blog and elsewhere.

Is Rejection of the Liquidity Trap Doctrine an Act of Willful Blindness?

A number of posters write that this blog does not engage in any economic analysis, and while I might disagree with that claim, nonetheless this blog is not as analytical as some others, including Bob Murphy's Free Advice and Robert Wenzel's Economic Policy Journal, both of which are excellent blogs and well worth reading. (Both of them take on Paul Krugman and do it quite well. Murphy's latest devastating salvo is found here.)

Instead of going after Krugman's Monday NYT column, instead I want to deal -- using economic analysis -- with a recent Krugman blog post entitled: "Against Willful Denseness, The Gods Themselves Contend In Vain," in which he declares:

From the very beginning of the Lesser Depression, the central principle for understanding macroeconomic policy has been that everything is different when you’re in a liquidity trap. In particular, the whole case for fiscal stimulus and against austerity rests on the proposition that with interest rates up against the zero lower bound, the central bank can neither achieve full employment on its own nor offset the contractionary effect of spending cuts or tax hikes.

This isn’t hard, folks; it’s just Macro 101. Yet a large number of economists — never mind politicians or policy makers — seems to have a very hard time grasping this basic concept.

He adds:

We’re not talking about stupid people here; clearly, there’s something about the notion that the rules for policy depend on the situation that some economists just don’t want to understand.

In other words, Krugman has explained it, so it must be true, and anyone who might disagree with him either is hopelessly ignorant or, frankly, evil. There can be no honest disagreement, since to disagree with Krugman on this point is dishonest.

Understand, I am taking his words and, I believe, interpreting them fairly.This is what I learned in Logic 101 as the "appeal to authority," which here means that since the term "liquidity trap" is taught in macroeconomics, then there can be no argument against it, any more than one is permitted to claim that FDR's New Deal extended the Great Depression or that high tax rates just might squelch capital investment.

Moreover, just because Krugman appeals to the "liquidity trap" does not mean it is a legitimate economic concept. Murray N. Rothbard 50 years ago took on this doctrine and had a number of criticisms, writing:

The ultimate weapon in the Keynesian arsenal of explanations of depressions is the "liquidity trap." This is not precisely a critique of the Mises theory, but it is the last line of Keynesian defense of their own inflationary "cures" for depression. Keynesians claim that "liquidity preference" (demand for money) may be so persistently high that the rate of interest could not fall low enough to stimulate investment sufficiently to raise the economy out of the depression. This statement assumes that the rate of interest is determined by "liquidity preference" instead of by time preference; and it also assumes again that the link between savings and investment is very tenuous indeed, only tentatively exerting itself through the rate of interest. But, on the contrary, it is not a question of saving and investment each being acted upon by the rate of interest; in fact, saving, investment, and the rate of interest are each and all simultaneously determined by individual time preferences on the market. Liquidity preference has nothing to do with this matter.

Furthermore, interest rates are not low because people's time preferences have changed and they are saving more. No, they are low because the Federal Reserve System has pushed them down to artificially-low levels, while at the same time, the Fed is trying to prop up malinvestments not only  here but also across the globe.

I would add the the "liquidity trap" doctrine also is based upon the economic fallacy that government essentially can do away with the Law of Scarcity by pushing down interest rates and by printing money. If one were to ask Krugman how this is possible, he would counter that there are "idle resources" (including lots of unemployed labor) that are sitting fallow because of a "lack of demand."

If one were to continue the questioning with, "What caused the 'lack of demand'?" he would answer, "Because people stopped spending." And if one asked, "Why did people stop spending," he most likely would answer, "Because of the financial crisis."

Yet, what caused the financial crisis? Malinvestments. That's right, malinvestments, those very things that Keynesians claim can be turned profitable with just a little more "stimulus" money, created the crisis in the first place. (Kind of like the housing market, which the government unsuccessfully has tried to reflate since its collapse in 2008.)

Now, that is interesting, given that malinvestment is an Austrian term, and Austrians are not supposed to know anything about economics. The idea behind "stimulus" and ratcheting up spending is that if the government spends enough money on lots of things, somehow those malinvested items will be resurrected and become profitable again. Now, why these things would supernaturally become profitable is another question, but Krugman and the Keynesians seem to believe that as long as the government is throwing money at something, sooner or later it will become a winner. (Krugman's insistence that massive government subsidies of "green energy" some day will magically transform that industry into something genuinely profitable is an example of the wishful thinking that accompanies Keynesianism.)

I also would add that the "liquidity trap" doctrine assumes that even though mutually-beneficial exchanges would be possible, individuals will act irrationally refuse to act on those opportunities. Why? "Because we are in a liquidity trap," and everyone knows that the liquidity trap overturns logic, the Law of Opportunity Cost, and probably the Law of Gravity.

My larger point is that Austrians really do have a basis for disagreeing with the Keynesian viewpoints, and the basis is grounded in logic and fundamental laws of economics. That Krugman interprets this disagreement as nothing more than yahoos wallowing in their willfulness says much more about Krugman than it does the Austrians.

Are the Austrians Wrong?

Paul Krugman is at it again with the Austrians, creating straw men and then shooting down the arguments that they never made in the first place. Today, he goes after Peter Schiff, who actually did a very good job warning people about the housing bubble. Of course, in the process of supposedly discrediting Schiff, he discredits himself, too.

Krugman writes:

Now, the thing about Schiff and all the other Austrians predicting runaway inflation is that they were right to make this prediction given their model. If you believe that a recession is caused by a failure on the production side of the economy, the result of past malinvestment or something, you should also believe that any attempt to correct this decline by expanding credit will simply result in too much money chasing too few goods, and hence a lot of inflation.

By the same token, the failure of high inflation to materialize amounts to a decisive rejection of that model. (And no, it’s not because the numbers are fudged; independent estimates don’t differ significantly from official inflation.)

First, I agree that since the increase in the monetary base has come about by expanding bank reserves, the only way the new money will move into the economy will be through a huge expansion of loans, which has not happened. Yes, much of that new money has gone into government bonds, but we have to remember that much of what is raised through government bond auctions is used to pay off previous bonds. (This is something the ancients once called "robbing Peter to pay Paul.") Even Austrians know that the new money has to circulate before it affects asset prices.

However, Krugman misses something that is obvious: The Austrians, including Schiff, recognized the housing bubble for what it was, a huge set of malinvestments. After all, if there are no malinvestments, there is no bubble. So, how could a theory that actually predicted the meltdown also be a bad theory, if we are to use Krugman's criteria for determining if a theory has validity or not.

Second, while we have seen significant price increases in food and fuel, and these increases come in part because of the continual debasing of the dollar. What we have not seen has been hyperinflation and I agree with Krugman that this is because the economy is depressed. No one in the Austrian camp would deny this.

Third, the very fact that we have had massive malinvestments that cannot be supported by the market certainly is going to bring a downward effect on the economy and on prices. Furthermore, with government moving vast amounts of money to prop up the failing housing market, not to mention subsidizing "green energy" and banks, why should we be surprised that there is a huge lack of economic growth?

However, understand that Krugman also has called for government measures that would vastly expand the rate of inflation, that being his call for the Federal Reserve System to be the primary buyer of U.S. short-term securities, something that for now is prohibited by law. (Krugman claimed that a "clever lawyer" could find a way to re-interpret the law, and I am sure he is right, given how the government has re-interpreted other laws to fit the interests of politicians.)

If that were to take place, then there is no doubt we would see massive inflation as the bond sales would be financed almost entirely by new money, which then would be spent by the government. Krugman pretty much said the same thing in his Monday column, claiming that government can just print its way out of this morass without any real consequences, since inflation would "be good for the economy."

There is one thing that troubles me whenever Krugman claims that Austrians are willfully blind because they have not bowed to Krugman's demands that they declare the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle to be invalid, and it is this: If real increases in government spending, massive Fed purchases of both private and public securities, and vast subsidies given to "green" industries, along with a huge auto industry bailout have not produced a robust recovery, then should not Krugman also take a hard look at his model?

(Yes, yes, I know. Krugman says that the problem is we have not had enough government spending, enough taxation, enough printing, enough borrowing, and, of course, enough inflation. After all, Krugman is a strong believer in the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy of inflation and economic growth, and despite historical evidence to the contrary, Krugman is not going to abandon what seems to be his real religion.)

Wenzel at the Fed

Bob Wenzel recently spoke at the New York Federal Reserve Bank and I include both his speech, which is a classic, and his remarks about the background of the speech. One thing I find interesting is that none of the economists there had any inkling of what the Austrians actually said versus what they "believed" the Austrians had said.

(One economist actually believed that the Austrians were the Chicago School and that the Austrians had invented the equation of exchange. I must admit to being floored by that one.)

I still have not watched the Krugman-Paul "debate," although I did read Krugman's snarky comments on his blog in which he accuses Dr. Paul of babbling. I especially find this quote to be interesting:

If Ron Paul got on TV and said “Gah gah goo goo debasement! theft!” — which is a rough summary of what he actually did say — his supporters would say that he won the debate hands down; I don’t think my supporters are quite the same, but opinions may differ. (Emphasis mine)

Yeah, Krugman believes that Really Smart and Serious People are his followers. I know one of his followers. He told me in the 1980s that the reason that the socialist economy of the Soviet Union was backward and chaotic was that the U.S.S.R. had not been a country as long as the United States. Chew on that one for a while.

Nonetheless, I love how Krugman sets himself up not only to be intellectually superior, but superior in every way to those mundanes who might believe that inflating money just might create long-term harm. Yeah, I know. Anyone who believes that really should be herded onto a farm somewhere and fed grass and oats.

Krugman takes on the Austrians and Ron Paul (and, as usual, misrepresents what they are saying)

Gee, hoodathunkitt? Paul Krugman hates Ron Paul. It is not enough for Dr. Paul to want to leave abortion to state legislatures (where the U.S. Constitution would place it), but the very fact that Dr. Paul is personally opposed to abortion and would not perform one is enough to send Krugman into a rage.

Furthermore, Krugman attacks Dr. Paul on the matter of civil rights. Now, keep in mind that Dr. Paul is not against civil rights per se, given that no other person on the scene, Democrat or Republican, that is running for president that openly opposes the police state that both parties have created. (Sorry, Krugman. One cannot support both civil rights AND a police state. So, who is against civil rights?)

Anyway, Krugman is not referring to Dr. Paul's views on race, but rather Dr. Paul's view of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Like all Progressives, Krugman holds that any law or regulation that is created in the name of something like civil rights is in itself the very essence of those rights. As Frederic Bastiat wrote in The Law in 1848, socialists (and I should add, Progressives) always couched beliefs within a specific government action:

Socialism, like the ancient ideas from which it springs, confuses the distinction between government and society. As a result of this, every time we object to a thing being done by government, the socialists conclude that we object to its being done at all.

We disapprove of state education. Then the socialists say that we are opposed to any education. We object to a state religion. Then the socialists say that we want no religion at all. We object to a state-enforced equality. Then they say that we are against equality. And so on, and so on. It is as if the socialists were to accuse us of not wanting persons to eat because we do not want the state to raise grain.

Likewise, according to Paul Krugman, the only reason one could oppose sections of the Civil Rights Act which give government huge swaths of control over private property is racism. (Likewise, if one thinks that ANY environmental regulation is bad or unnecessary, then one is in favor of having feces wash up on beaches, to paraphrase Anthony Lewis, who also wrote his columns at the NYT.)

But Krugman was only getting warmed up when he accused Ron Paul of being a racist and a misogynist. (And why else would one be opposed to abortion than out of hatred for women? Gloria Steinem has declared such, and so it is an established truth, at least at Princeton University and the NYT.)

Ron Paul, writes Krugman:

...(ignores) reality, clinging to his ideology even as the facts have demonstrated that ideology’s wrongness. And, even more unfortunately, Paulist ideology now dominates a Republican Party that used to know better.

Given the open opposition that Republican stalwarts have exhibited toward Dr. Paul, the idea that his "ideology" is dominating the GOP is a very sick joke, but Krugman seems to be full of humor these days. Unfortunately, he totally misstates the position that Austrians have on money, and he further writes that all Austrians believe that the monetary base is exactly the same as money that is circulating.

First, as he points out in the article, the Fed massively increased the monetary base and some Austrians have said that sooner or later if that base is turned into large-scale lending, we are going to have inflation. That is a no-brainer. However, because some Austrians have said that maybe inflation will occur sooner rather than later, according to Krugman, that means that all Austrian theory on money is wrong. (This is what the ancients once called a non sequitur, but without the non sequitur, Krugman would not have any columns.

Second, Krugman continues in that insistence:

Austrians, and for that matter many right-leaning economists, were sure about what would happen as a result: There would be devastating inflation. One popular Austrian commentator who has advised Mr. Paul, Peter Schiff, even warned (on Glenn Beck’s TV show) of the possibility of Zimbabwe-style hyperinflation in the near future.

So here we are, three years later. How’s it going? Inflation has fluctuated, but, at the end of the day, consumer prices have risen just 4.5 percent, meaning an average annual inflation rate of only 1.5 percent. Who could have predicted that printing so much money would cause so little inflation? Well, I could. And did. And so did others who understood the Keynesian economics Mr. Paul reviles. But Mr. Paul’s supporters continue to claim, somehow, that he has been right about everything.

Austrians are not shocked at what has transpired. The economy, thanks to the bailouts, explosion of regulations, and incendiary rhetoric from the White House, is mired in depression, just as Austrians predicted it would be if the policies of the past four years were followed. As long as the monetary base remains just that -- a base -- and the money does not circulate, the official rate of inflation will be low. What I do find interesting, however, is Krugman's insistence that commodity prices have nothing to do with inflation, that the only reason they rise and fall is because of demand from "emerging economies" and "volatility." (Of course, "volatility" is an effect, not a cause, but since Keynesians regularly confuse cause and effect, we should not be surprised at Krugman's conclusions.)

You see, if Austrians are wrong in their belief that an expansion of money in circulation will force up prices (and that is what Krugman insinuates), then all of monetary theory is turned upside down. For that matter, Krugman already is on the record in calling for the Fed to directly purchase U.S. Government securities on the primary market, which in essence would be financing government via the printing press. Does Krugman also believe that such an action would not have a huge effect upon prices of goods, or does he want us to believe that any predictions of inflation here would be wrong?

Krugman's insistence that Austrians are ignorant about money is, well, ignorant. Austrians say that money is a secondary good which has a primary use to facilitate exchanges, and its productivity exists in the fact that it allows exchanges to occur that would not happen in a barter economy. Austrians further hold that money is subject to all of the laws of economics, including the Law of Marginal Utility (no, we don't hold that it simply is a quantity variable).

However, one of the most important aspects of Austrian thinking on money is that Austrians emphasize the transmission mechanism of new money being injected into the economy, and that transmission is non-neutral, for those receiving the new money first will be able to pay for goods at the old prices, but with new incomes. This view contrasts with the Keynesian viewpoint that monetary transmission is neutral, and that the only thing which matters is that money get put into the economy so that someone can spend it.

Moreover, Austrians also point out that the injection of new money into the economy also will have an effect upon the relative prices of goods, and that the relations will change as more money pours in. This contrasts with Krugman's view that new money has no such effect, and that everyone benefits equally from monetary injections. (In Krugman's view, while inflation benefits debtors at the expense of creditors, that is OK because he falsely assumes that all creditors are the "one percent" and that all debtors are in the other category.)

So, because hyperinflation has not hit, Austrians are totally ignorant about money, and that includes Ron Paul. We are dealing with timing, not monetary theory, and Krugman by confusing the former and latter, demonstrates his own ignorance about monetary matters.

Wrong and wrong

Paul Krugman seems to have a need to claiming time and again that he is right and everyone else is wrong, and his "proof" is that interest rates did not go up as predicted by the editorial writers at the Wall Street Journal (thus, giving us the overworked "bond vigilantes" phrase). He also constantly invokes his "confidence fairy" line, but has not given proof of its lack of veracity -- except to use the term with the idea that his constantly saying it "proves" it is true.

His newest pen pal, Bruce Bartlett, seems to have gone over to the Keynesian side, and now he has David Frum to join him. I have linked Frum's mea culpa article for those who wish to read it.

However, there are a number of people who also have been wrong, people that Krugman never will acknowledge because he already has attacked them as being wrong and stupid all of the time: the Austrians. For example, in 2001 -- that's right, 2001 -- Ron Paul on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives declared that the Fed was in the process of engineering a housing bubble. However, since Rep. Paul subscribes to a theory that Krugman claims is no more credible than the "phlogiston theory of fire," then nothing Ron Paul says should have any veracity at all. (In Krugman's world, only Keynesians are right and everyone else -- even those that are right -- are wrong.)

Keep in mind that Krugman already has declared that the U.S. Government is not "broke," even though borrowing now is now out-of-control. Of course, Krugman's latest "scheme" is for the government to borrow obscene amounts of money, spend it, with the idea that the resulting spending will give the economy "traction" to move on its own. There is no causality other than Krugman's circular belief that spending will begat spending which will begat prosperity. In other words, he actually wants us to believe we can spend ourselves into prosperity.

Let us address his "confidence fairy" phrase for a minute. According to Krugman, business "confidence" is based solely on what business owners and managers perceive to be future spending. If someone will spend, business will build. Robert Higgs, however, notes that not only is Krugman wrong, economically speaking, but he also is contradicting his own guru, John Maynard Keynes:

The humor columnist for the New York Times, Paul Krugman, has recently taken to defending his vulgar Keynesianism against its critics by accusing them of making arguments that rely on the existence of a “confidence fairy.” By this mockery, Krugman seeks to dismiss the critics as unscientific blockheads, in contrast to his own supreme status as a Nobel Prize-winning economic scientist.

The irony in this dismissal, as others, including my friend Donald Boudreaux, have already pointed out, is that Krugman’s own vulgar Keynesianism relies on a much more ethereal explanatory force for its own account of macroeconomic fluctuations–namely, the so-called animal spirits. The master himself wrote in The General Theory: “Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die. . . . [I]ndividual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits. . . .” (p. 162). Because Keynes conceived of his “animal spirits” as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” (p. 161), he of course had no way to explain their coming and going or to measure or evaluate them in any way. They are as surreal as a ghost–when and why they come and go, no man knows or can know. Such is the force that drives the ups and downs of private investment in Keynesian economic theory, and such theory unfailingly drives Krugman’s commentaries on the recession and on the possibility and effective means of recovery from it.

Since Krugman's "confidence fairy" line is aimed at Higgs' "regime uncertainty" view, I include what Higgs says about it:

Regime uncertainty, however, has a much more grounded basis. In my own research on the topic, I have presented evidence derived from (1) a mass of testimony by investors, businessmen, and other contemporaries, (2) voluminous historical facts on the character of government actions that reasonable people had every reason to interpret as theatening the security of their private property rights, (3) variations in the structure of investment, especially as between short-term and longer-term projects, and (4) specific twists in the term-structure of returns on private corporate bonds, as well as other relevant evidence on the behavior of financial markets.

As against this varied and substantial evidence, what does the proponent of animal sprits have to offer? Well, nothing at all. The idea is purely fanciful, the product of Lord Keynes’s fertile imagination.

So, this is what we have:

• Keynesians are right and Austrians are wrong (because Krugman says so)
• The Keynesians "doctrine" of "animal spirits" also is wrong because it contradicts Krugman's view of business confidence
• But Keynesian doctrine is right, even if it is not right.

So, there you have it. Krugman now is depending upon David Frum, a guy who long ago rejected anything to do with free markets and peaceful relations between people as being desirable, to validate his own Keynesian opinions. You just cannot make up this stuff.

Is it austerity, or reality?

One of Paul Krugman's constant themes has been that "austerity" is the wrong prescription to deal with a shrinking economy. If the economy is going south, he claims, then governments must spend and spend prodigiously in order to prop up everything. (Krugman adds that this should be the case when the economy is in a "liquidity trap," which he believes changes the rules of economics.)

At one level, I understand his point. The "austerity" programs often mean increased taxes and other government activities that can drag down an economic recovery (although Krugman has been insistent that we need massive tax increases in the USA, so I don't know why he would be against that aspect of "austerity").

Yet, there is something else out there, something that really divides the Keynesian and Austrian camps: Keynesians really believe that spending money is what creates wealth, and that governments can create wealth out of thin air simply by cranking up the spending. Furthermore, assets really are not real; if the economy goes into the tank, government simply can declare prosperity and if people believe (yes, only believe) that the spending will make everyone prosperous, then all is well.

How else can someone really claim that heavily-subsidized industries like "wind power" and "corn-based ethanol" can create overall prosperity and lead us into recovery. How else can someone really claim that if government takes enough resources away from everyone else and gives them to GM, Chrysler, and the United Auto Workers, that we will have overall prosperity?

Austrians do not see "austerity" as a policy, but rather a reality. This is not a morality play (even if Krugman has accused us of enjoying the infliction of "pain"), but rather a bowing to reality of the fact that one cannot fix a broken economy by pretending it is not broken.

There is something else I have noticed; in Krugman's view, if a policy has immediate "good effects," then the policy must be good. Thus, ANY liquidation of malinvestments also must be bad, bad, bad, as that means short-term pain.

It was not just the Keynesians who have demanded that we play a "let's pretend" game about the economy. Shortly after the financial crisis of the fall of 2008 became painfully obvious, Martin Feldstein, who was President Ronald Reagan's chief economic adviser, called for the government to enact what was little more than a scheme to prop up housing prices. Like the Keynesians, Feldstein could not recognize that falling prices were a symptom, not a cause of the larger problem.

In the Keynesian world, there are no malinvestments, only idle resources. Spend enough, and those resources will rise up. After all, doesn't Y = C+I+G+(X-M) tell us everything we need to know about the economy?

Well, not it doesn't. In fact, I will go as far as to say that the equation tells us next-to-nothing about an economy and how it works. The economy is not in recession because there is a lack of spending; there is a fall in spending because the economy is in recession, and we cannot spend ourselves into prosperity no matter what Krugman and the Keynesians tell us.

On Costs and Public Works Projects

The outright anger and angst shown by Paul Krugman and others regarding Gov. Chris Christie's cancellation of The Tunnel has been pretty predictable, but it also ignores the fact that governments today are spending huge amounts of money for things that were not in the budget back in the days of the Hoover Dam.

While I am not a regular reader of David Brooks' NYT column (given that I am not much into "National Greatness" Neoconservatism), I do believe that he has some important insights into the latest controversy in his column today. Perhaps the most important point he makes is that at the present time, state and local governments have most of their budgets carried away by government employees. He writes:

...nobody seems to be asking is: Why are important projects now unaffordable? Decades ago, when the federal and state governments were much smaller, they had the means to undertake gigantic new projects, like the Interstate Highway System and the space program. But now, when governments are bigger, they don’t.

The answer is what Jonathan Rauch of the National Journal once called demosclerosis. Over the past few decades, governments have become entwined in a series of arrangements that drain money from productive uses and direct it toward unproductive ones.

New Jersey can’t afford to build its tunnel, but benefits packages for the state’s employees are 41 percent more expensive than those offered by the average Fortune 500 company. These benefits costs are rising by 16 percent a year.

New York City has to strain to finance its schools but must support 10,000 former cops who have retired before age 50.

California can’t afford new water projects, but state cops often receive 90 percent of their salaries when they retire at 50. The average corrections officer there makes $70,000 a year in base salary and $100,000 with overtime (California spends more on its prison system than on its schools).

States across the nation will be paralyzed for the rest of our lives because they face unfunded pension obligations that, if counted accurately, amount to $2 trillion — or $87,000 per plan participant.

Unfortunately, the Keynesian version of this seems to be that the more governments pay out to employees in pay and benefits, the more "aggregate demand" is created. As one of the people who regularly comments on this blog wrote: "What Austrians do not understand is wages are not just a cost – they are always income as well."

This is most instructive, for what he is saying is that the higher the rates of pay, the more wealth is created. No, Austrians are not unaware that one's paycheck is one's income, but we hold that the Keynesians have it backward. One's paycheck should reflect the value of the marginal revenue product one has created, and if pay is raised above such a level -- as is often the case with unionized government employees -- then the real wages of others, after the transfers via taxation are completed are diminished to rates below their MRP (or Discounted MVP, to quote Murray Rothbard).

The Keynesians seem to believe that government spending itself creates wealth, so the more that government spends -- no matter how it does so, taxation, borrowing, or printing dollars -- the wealthier we become. Obviously, Keynesians and Austrians are at an impasse at this point, and there really is no bridging of the intellectual gulf.

Brooks is arguing that there really is a "crowding out" effect of government in which the public employee unions make it increasingly costly for state and local governments to afford to carry out many public works projects. Murray Rothbard noted that over time, true monopolies are captured by their employees, and by definition, governments are monopolies. I believe that this version of a "Capture Theory" is correctly applied here.

Krugman Agonistes: We Are In the "Dark Ages" of Economics

While Paul Krugman has a column today alleging that the Obama administration really has not significantly ramped up domestic spending (which is why he says the economy is mired in the doldrums), I want to go back to something he wrote in January 2009, in which he lays out some opposing lines of economic thought (and stays out of partisan politics, for a change).

Furthermore, I find myself agreeing with Krugman that we are in a "Dark Ages" of economic thinking, but for very different reasons. Krugman is alleging that too many economists are accepting Say's Law as being legitimate, when every good Keynesian knows that J.M. Keynes "discredited" Say's Law in the mid-1930s. I disagree wholeheartedly on many fronts.

The difficulties are legion. First, like Keynes, Krugman really gets Say's Law wrong, creating a caricature of what Say wrote in 1803 and then demolishing the straw man he has created. (One has to keep in mind that Say's Law really is a huge obstacle to Krugmanomics, and, like Keynes, Krugman instinctively understands that point.

Second, the argument really goes to the heart of what constitutes what we call an economy. On one side, we see people like J.B. Say and the Austrians write that an economy consists of real things, real assets, and real relationships between goods. On the other side, we see people like Krugman and Alan Blinder and Ben Bernanke insist that governments can create wealth simply by creating money or borrowing and spending. In their view, an economy is little more than a mechanistic entity in which people robotically create goods with the requirement being that they have enough "purchasing power" so consumers can clear the shelves via spending so that the process can repeat itself.

I would urge people to read Krugman's entire blog post to see the perspective from which he is coming. I will include this quote, which I believe is instructive. Calling the perspectives from Eugene Fama and John Cochrane "pure Say's Law," Krugman writes:

There’s no ambiguity in either case: both Fama and Cochrane are asserting that desired savings are automatically converted into investment spending, and that any government borrowing must come at the expense of investment — period.

What’s so mind-boggling about this is that it commits one of the most basic fallacies in economics — interpreting an accounting identity as a behavioral relationship. Yes, savings have to equal investment, but that’s not something that mystically takes place, it’s because any discrepancy between desired savings and desired investment causes something to happen that brings the two in line.

First, and most important, what we call Say's Law is not about accounting identities or even the infamous S=I. Instead, it is about the fact that consumption and production are intricately related, not by a circular patterns, but rather by the simple fact that one's ability to consume MUST arise from the ability of someone to be able to produce something.

I deal with all of this in a paper I published last year on Say's Law in which I take a telling quote from Benjamin Anderson:

The prevailing view among economists, . . . has long been that purchasing power grows out of production. The great producing countries are the great consuming countries. The twentieth-century world consumes vastly more than the eighteenth-century world because it produces vastly more. . . . Supply and demand in the aggregate are thus not merely equal, but they are identical, since every commodity may be looked upon either as supply of its own kind or as demand for other things. But this doctrine is subject to the great qualification that the proportions must be right; that there must be equilibrium.

This view contrasts with the Keynesian/Marxist views that the real problem with a recessionary economy is that there is the problem of overproduction/underconsumption which can be "solved" by the injection of "purchasing power" into the hands of individuals via government intervention. Call it "pump priming," "giving the economy traction," or "enabling workers to buy back the products they created," but nonetheless all three viewpoints operate on the notion that production and consumption are two unequal and unrelated activities, and that the purpose of consumption (or "spending") is to clear the shelves of the goods that workers made so that the workers can be employed making more of them.

Now, the Keynesian argument -- which Krugman repeats -- is that in the real world, savings are greater than investment, especially when the "animal spirits" of investors are quieted. When that is the case, and investment spending is down, it is up to government to fill in the hole by ratcheting up spending. Now, I don't believe I have mischaracterized Krugman's position here, but, nonetheless, I strongly disagree with it.

First, even if I were to give Krugman his point that S>I, nonetheless (and I have not seen this discussed anywhere) the nature of fractional reserve banking would take the existing savings/deposits and loan them out to where the actual new money created would be substantially greater than the savings base. It is true that banks rarely are going to be fully "loaned up," but Krugman ignores the money multiplier that occurs in lending, something that any student who has taken Money and Banking or even a Macro class would understand.

Second, there is something even more fundamental here, and that is the fact that the Krugman position almost seems to be that the Law of Scarcity is abolished when interest rates approach the "zero bound" (in his words). This also is where Krugman and the Austrians really part company, for in Austrian Economics, the Law of Scarcity is not abandoned at the "zero bound" or the presence of unemployed resources.

Instead, Austrians look to reasons as to why the resources are unemployed, as opposed to the Keynesian argument that people and government simply are not spending enough. Instead, we wish to look beyond to why there no longer is demand for certain things, and to the larger issue of how the proportions involving the factors of production have been disturbed or distorted.

As I have said many times, the Keynesian argument depends upon seeing factors of production as being homogeneous and having no particular special relationships. Everything from mine output to making of cotton candy is just one amorphous and homogeneous set of factors. This is not economic theory; it is a theory of convenience to justify the presence of government spending.

Paul Krugman's Excellent Protectionist Adventure

Note: Before starting on my post today, I want to share an excellent article, "My Encounter With Paul Krugman," by Murray Sabrin, a professor of finance in the Anisfield School of Business, Ramapo College of New Jersey. Prof. Sabrin lays out the Keynesian nonsense that Krugman gave in his talk and provides an alternative explanation. The article is well-worth reading.

(Murray is a friend of mine and is a regular reader of KIW. Yes, my sympathies to him on both counts!)

One of the things Krugman likes to do is to write a number of columns and blog posts according to a certain theme, and he keeps things varied, although the Keynesian thread runs through them. Thus, he "stays on message" even when moving from one area to another.

In his column, "Taking On China," Krugman repeats a couple of his constant themes: China's refusal to allow its currency to have an official value that meets Krugman's approval is helping to cause this current depression, and protectionism is a legitimate policy when the economy is in the tank. He writes:

Serious people were appalled by Wednesday’s vote in the House of Representatives, where a huge bipartisan majority approved legislation, sponsored by Representative Sander Levin, that would potentially pave the way for sanctions against China over its currency policy. As a substantive matter, the bill was very mild; nonetheless, there were dire warnings of trade war and global economic disruption. Better, said respectable opinion, to pursue quiet diplomacy.

But serious people, who have been wrong about so many things since this crisis began — remember how budget deficits were going to lead to skyrocketing interest rates and soaring inflation? — are wrong on this issue, too. Diplomacy on China’s currency has gone nowhere, and will continue going nowhere unless backed by the threat of retaliation. The hype about trade war is unjustified — and, anyway, there are worse things than trade conflict. In a time of mass unemployment, made worse by China’s predatory currency policy, the possibility of a few new tariffs should be way down on our list of worries.

So, let's see. Because prices are not rising out of control right now when some people predicted that the Federal Reserve System's vast expansion of the monetary base was going on, that means protectionism is a worthy policy. This is a typical fallacy that Krugman uses, the non sequitur.

To further his cause, Krugman resorts to another fallacy, the "Appeal to Authority," by enlisting the late Paul Samuelson (another Nobel Prize winner) who was one of Krugman's mentors when he was in graduate school at MIT. In a recent blog post, Krugman quotes Samuelson:

With employment less than full and Net National Product suboptimal, all the debunked mercantilist arguments turn out to be valid.

Yes! Laws of economics from the Law of Scarcity to the Marginal Utility Theory of Value hold ONLY when times are good! However, if the economy is sluggish, then it is time to trot out "Fable of the Bees" and start all over again.

Krugman lavishes praise upon those in Congress who are pushing this latest round of protectionism. (He calls this latest move "bipartisan," so I guess when Republicans -- who always have been protectionist since their beginnings in the 1850s -- aren't so bad when they do Krugman's bidding, or at least we can say they have taken a holiday from their usual goals of Doing Evil.)

However, as he has done with the "stimulus" and new government spending, Krugman claims that this still is not enough. I only can imagine that his next move would be to trot out Smoot-Hawley II, since it worked so well the first time it was imposed. He writes:

For the truth is that U.S. policy makers have been incredibly, infuriatingly passive in the face of China’s bad behavior — especially because taking on China is one of the few policy options for tackling unemployment available to the Obama administration, given Republican obstructionism on everything else. The Levin bill probably won’t change that passivity. But it will, at least, start to build a fire under policy makers, bringing us closer to the day when, at long last, they are ready to act.

So, it seems that those Evil Republicans have not been channeling enough of their Inner Smoot-Hawley to satisfy Krugman, but maybe, just maybe, we can have a full-blown world-wide trade war, blaming those Dastardly Chinese for their intransigence and for their effrontery in producing goods that Americans want to buy (and for buying U.S. Treasuries by the handful in order to fund our own deficit spending).

No doubt, this will rev up Krugman's base, as his supporters will claim that we can have this wonderful economy based upon a form of autarky. (It is amazing that Krugman actually got his Nobel Prize allegedly for his trade theory, as now he is claiming that unless currencies are matched according to Krugman standards, trade creates poverty.)

Keynesianism is based upon a belief that the laws of economics hold only in special conditions, and when those conditions are not met, then governments need to act as though the Law of Scarcity does not exist. To Austrians like me, the laws of economics are like the Law of Gravity: they are immutable and always apply.

As I see it, Krugman's latest missives contain about as much sound thinking as would be a directive from the MIT graduate that in special conditions, the Law of Gravity does not hold. However, I somehow doubt we would see Krugman then getting ready to take a leap off the Empire State Building, but economically speaking, that is exactly what he is demanding we should do.

Krugman, Keynesians, the Austrians, and the Housing Bubble

In a blog post, Paul Krugman points out that a number of "austerians" (people who believe we need to have fiscal and monetary responsibility) did not see the "housing bubble" approaching -- and he did. Therefore, according to Krugman logic, "austerity" must be bad.

As I see it, the logical construct goes this way:

1. The "austerians" were wrong on the housing bubble;
2. Krugman was right on the housing bubble;
3. Therefore, we need lots more government spending because Krugman believes that is what we need.

This is a classic non sequitur, and I hate to say it, but Krugman's correct view of the bubble does not mean he is correct today. The rightness or wrongness of his argument depends upon both the application of laws of economics and the current situation, period.

Now, in looking at the whole housing bubble business, let me say that I am not going to jump on Krugman's 2002 comment about Alan Greenspan needing to create "a housing bubble to replace the NASDAQ bubble." Krugman has denied that he was advocating such a bubble, and I am willing to take him at his word.

Nonetheless, there are two things that need to be discussed here. The first is the fact that the Austrians, and specifically Mark Thornton, were out in front to call the housing bubble what it was. Thornton wrote in 2004 that the housing market was "too good to be true," and also had this article in February 2004 that buttresses his claims.

Yet, Professor Thornton also is an "austerian," at least in Krugman's definition. He also predicted and recognized the housing bubble long before even Krugman made mention of it. So, there seems to be a crack in Krugman's rejection of "austerity" measures for the economy.

Before going further, however, I need to point out that Austrians are not "austerians" in the mainstream (or statist) view of economics. Austrians believe that the market should be free to sort out the malinvestments that came with the boom, and for the necessary liquidation and repositioning of assets to occur. This is quite different than the view that GOVERNMENT should be IMPOSING austerity. In the Austrian view, the government role is passive while in the mainstream view, government is active in its imposition of policies.

(I need to point out that Krugman rejects both viewpoints. Government needs to be active, showering new money, encouraging spending, and doing lots of borrowing and spending itself, according to Krugman.)

My second point is more theoretical. Keynesians deal solely in aggregates, because they believe that if government both engages in generalized spending (and encourages consumers and businesses to do the same), the economy will recover and grow to full employment -- provided the spending is great enough. However, Keynesianism does not have any kind of coherent capital theory, and I don't see how one can have a bubble, which constitutes a malinvestment in the Austrian view, AND, at the same time, claim that all that is needed is spending.

As I have written many times before (and I am hardly the only Austrian to be saying this), the Keynesian view implies that factors of production are homogeneous, and that it does not matter what kind of spending takes place, just as long as there is adequate spending. This cannot logically square with the creation of bubbles, since asset bubbles are specific and they clearly are malinvestments, yet Krugman continues to deny any theory that includes malinvestments.

Furthermore, Krugman knows that one cannot sustain a bubble, since bubbles by their very definition are not sustainable. Yet, he seems to be arguing that we need to both try to sustain this bubble, or at least not let housing prices fall, and, at the same time, recognize what a bubble really is. These two views are mutually exclusive.

So, in both sets of arguments, I believe that Krugman is using a non sequitur, nor does it surprise me he is doing so.

Krugman's Willful Distortion of the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle

Once again, Paul Krugman creates a caricature of the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle, calling it the "Hangover Theory," and then continues to misrepresent what it says and what its adherents say in their analysis of the boom and bust cycles. His recent blog post continues this dishonesty.

Before dealing directly with his accusations about the ATBC, I will note that both David Gordon and Robert Murphy do credible jobs in debunking Krugman's misrepresentations. I will add briefly to what they already have written.

Krugman declares:

...one more thing struck me: at least some members of the FOMC have bought into the hangover theory — the modern version of liquidationism in which mass unemployment is somehow necessary in the aftermath of a burst bubble....

This is an important point, because while Austrians are adamant that malinvested resources and capital that were created or advanced during the boom are NOT sustainable during the crisis and the subsequent bust. (Krugman, it should be noted, insists on saying that Austrians, such as Nobel-Prize Laureate F.A. Hayek, push an "overinvestment" theory when, in fact, the Austrians have dealt with that very term and have said it is not an appropriate one in the ATBC. In other words, even though Austrians address that very word, Krugman still pretends as though they have not done so.)

Furthermore, Austrians, unlike Keynesians, who believe that factors of production generally are homogeneous and are equally affected by new injections of spending, look carefully at the issues of the factors, for what is where the result of the downturn are concentrated. Furthermore, NO Austrian calls for some sort of "general liquidation" of the economy. Instead, Austrians hold that those investments in capital and other factors that no longer are sustainable should be liquidated or transferred to other uses for which there clearly is consumer demand. This is a far cry from Krugman's point.

I know of NO Austrian who claims that "mass unemployment is somehow necessary in the aftermath of a burst bubble," none. Austrians say that if there is mass unemployment (and especially if that unemployment is chronic) we can look to government intervention as the reason. Rothbard, in America's Great Depression, writes:

If government wishes to see a depression ended as quickly as possible, and the economy returned to normal prosperity, what course should it adopt? The first and clearest injunction is: don't interfere with the market's adjustment process. The more the government intervenes to delay the market's adjustment, the longer and more grueling the depression will be, and the more difficult will be the road to complete recovery. Government hampering aggravates and perpetuates the depression. Yet, government depression policy has always (and would have even more today) aggravated the very evils it has loudly tried to cure. If, in fact, we list logically the various ways that government could hamper market adjustment, we will find that we have precisely listed the favorite "anti-depression" arsenal of government policy. (Emphasis mine)

Rothbard then explains the policies that are most harmful:

1. Prevent or delay liquidation. Lend money to shaky businesses, call on banks to lend further, etc.

2. Inflate further. Further inflation blocks the necessary fall in prices, thus delaying adjustment and prolonging depression. Further credit expansion creates more malinvestments, which, in their turn, will have to be liquidated in some later depression. A government "easy money" policy prevents the market's return to the necessary higher interest rates.

3. Keep wage rates up. Artificial maintenance of wage rates in a depression insures permanent mass unemployment. Furthermore, in a deflation, when prices are falling, keeping the same rate of money wages means that real wage rates have been pushed higher. In the face of falling business demand, this greatly aggravates the unemployment problem.

4. Keep prices up. Keeping prices above their free-market levels will create unsalable surpluses, and prevent a return to prosperity.

5. Stimulate consumption and discourage saving. We have seen that more saving and less consumption would speed recovery; more consumption and less saving aggravate the shortage of saved-capital even further. Government can encourage consumption by "food stamp plans" and relief payments. It can discourage savings and investment by higher taxes, particularly on the wealthy and on corporations and estates. As a matter of fact, any increase of taxes and government spending will discourage saving and investment and stimulate consumption, since government spending is all consumption. Some of the private funds would have been saved and invested; all of the government funds are consumed.[15] Any increase in the relative size of government in the economy, therefore, shifts the societal consumption-investment ratio in favor of consumption, and prolongs the depression.

6. Subsidize unemployment. Any subsidization of unemployment (via unemployment "insurance," relief, etc.) will prolong unemployment indefinitely, and delay the shift of workers to the fields where jobs are available.

Interestingly, ALL of these things listed above are precisely what Krugman claims will END the downturn. Yet, we have seen government do these things in spades, yet the economy continues to tank. Rothbard clearly notes that mass unemployment, and especially mass unemployment over a long period of time, is NOT necessary, but generally occurs because of government intervention, not in spite of it.

So what does Krugman do? He claims that the REAL problem is that government did not spend enough, regulate enough, tax enough, jack up wages past marginal productivity levels, and subsidize enough unproductive industries (i.e. "green" jobs). And when the economy continues to tank, he creates a caricature of the only business cycle theory that accurately explains what is happening, and then builds a series of falsehoods from there. Just another day at the office for Paul Krugman.

Consumption and Spending, and Other Links

In my latest column for the Freeman Online, I differentiate (in 700 words) between consumption and spending. The Keynesians (and Krugman groupies) see spending as mechanistic and necessary so we can repeat the circular "economy" in which we make stuff, put it on the shelves, and then "spend" so that we can clear the shelves so that people will have something to do: make more stuff to put on the shelves.

There are a number of other excellent articles as well. Wendy McElroy looks at the attempts by Sen. Harry Reid to effectively "federalize" the local police, thus making them even less accountable than they are now. Sheldon Richman comments on the latest "re-regulation" of the financial sector, and Steven Horowitz examines Austrian capital theory.

Have a great weekend.

Tax Cuts, Revenues, and Trends of the 1970s

During the 1980 Presidential campaign, we can say that it was the last time that we heard actual issues being discussed, as opposed to the slick media campaigns today complete with the hard-core negative attack ads (with black-and-white photos, etc.). (We don't have TV reception, and I have not watched political ads on a regular basis since 2000. I don't miss them, and I don't miss most television.)

One feature of the campaign was the debate between people who called themselves Supply Siders and what Robert Higgs would call Vulgar Keynesians. The Supply Siders claimed that cutting marginal tax rates (the highest rates then were at 70 percent) would generate so much new economic activity that the rate cuts would "pay for themselves."

Keynesians, on the other hand, said that tax cuts would increase the rate of inflation (I remember a Bill Maudin cartoon which had an evil-looking Ronald Reagan pouring gasoline on a fire, the gasoline labeled "tax cuts"). So, what happened?

Paul Krugman claims to know, and he gives us a revisionist view of the 70s and beyond with this diagram:

He explains his point:

A couple of points. First, the Carter years, contrary to legend, were not a period of economic stagnation and falling revenue because high tax rates were strangling the economy; there was a nasty recession starting in 1979, largely thanks to an oil shock, but overall growth was respectable and revenue growth reasonably high.

Second, the revenue track under Reagan looks a lot like the track under Bush: a drop in revenues, then a resumption of growth, but no return to the previous trend.

This is exactly what you would expect to see if supply-side economics were just plain wrong: revenues are permanently reduced relative to what they would otherwise have been.

As usual, one has to do some re-interpreting of Krugman's remarks. First, and most important, I believe that the issue of revenue is a red herring. After all, if the government wishes to raise more revenue today, all it has to do is to confiscate everything we have, and I suspect that the government budget would almost be balanced, at least for one year (but not beyond that).

Now, not even a Keynesian True Believer like Krugman would advocate such a thing, although there are plenty of people in Washington who probably think this move by the government would be great. Furthermore, I never have been comfortable with the contention by Supply Siders that we could have our cake and eat it, too. Many of them were trying to claim that all that was needed by politicians was to cut tax rates, and everything else would fall into place.

However, there is yet another problem that neither Krugman nor the Supply Siders have addressed, and that was the Recession of 1982. As you can see in Krugman's graph, he assumes that ALL of the fall in revenues around 1982 was due to the lowering of the top rate from 70 percent to 50 percent. In other words, according to Krugman, had there been no tax cuts, apparently there would have been no recession.

(Note to the Krugman groupies: No, he does not say it directly, but the red trend line he created certainly implies it.)

Krugman's explanation for the recession of 1979 was the "oil shock," but other "oil shocks" have not started recessions. Whenever Keynesians try to bring in oil shocks or bad crops as explanations for recessions, I think about the mutually-exclusive set of excuses Jake Blues gave the Carrie Fisher character (his fiance) in "The Blues Brothers."

Yet, why did the recession occur in the early 1980s? Krugman has claimed elsewhere that it simply was the result of the Fed under Paul Volcker putting the stop to inflation, and certainly the double-digit inflation that infected the economy through 1981 (that Krugman fails to mention in this post). The Austrians have noted that a decade of boom and bust and massive inflation was certain to end in a recession, which is what we had.

However, in reading Krugman's post, I guess I am to assume that had the old regime of 70 percent tax rates and inflation been permitted to go on, there would have been no recession, the economy would have been great, and the government would be balancing its budget. However, if the recession of 1982 was inevitable (and Austrians believe that it was), then revenues would have fallen drastically, even had the 70 percent rates been in place. Krugman fails to mention that point, but I think it is relevant.

I have no idea whether or not cuts in tax rates "pay for themselves;" I do believe that high tax rates will hamper entrepreneurs and economic growth. Since Krugman is a Keynesian, and in that world, capital and other assets are homogeneous, economic growth is the simple function of money spent, and it matters not whether it is spent by individual consumers or the government.

By the way, as I have noted before, when I asked Krugman at a session of the Southern Economic Association meetings in New Orleans on Sunday, November 21, 2004, if he favored going back to the old 70 percent rates, he exclaimed, "Oh, no! Those rates were insane." Guess he is redefining insanity these days.

Krugman: In the Long Run, We Screw Future Generations

Years ago, I taught an Intermediate Macroeconomics college class in which the required text was written by Keynesian disciple Wallace Peterson. In short, the book quoted the General Theory as though it were Scripture, and repeated the numerous economic fallacies that make up the structure of Keynes' book.

(I countered Peterson with Henry Hazlitt's The Failure of the New Economics, which I featured yesterday.)

So, in his post today, he repeats Keynes' silly phrase, "In the long run we are all dead," as though it had great economic value. Now, perhaps certain self-absorbed people might think that when they pass, there are no more generations, but in the real world, the present generation will hand off its economy to the generations of the future -- and in THAT long run, they will very much be alive.

Krugman uses this line to insist that we really cannot afford at the present time to get our financial house in order. We need to borrow, spend, inflate, all to give that perpetual motion machine called an "economy" enough "traction" to where it can move on its own without government spending.

Now, I would love to know what plant Professor Krugman occupies, for on that planet, spending exists to bolster production for its own sake. Indeed, spending replaces consumption, for in the Austrian paradigm, people acquire goods they believe will meet their needs by purchasing them in the marketplace. "Spending," in that view, is a purposeful activity done by individuals who wish to satisfy their needs.

However, on Planet Krugman, spending is an activity that is done for the sole purpose of keeping people "employed." It does not matter what is produced just as long as the government (or someone else) purchases it. If one steps back and takes a hard look at this paradigm, one can see that it is not "economics" at all, but rather something that turns production and exchange upside down.

Now, I can appreciate Krugman's point regarding the long and short runs. He is saying that if governments do not try to borrow and spend us into prosperity, then in the "long run," there will be no opportunity at all to bring prosperity, since the economy will be in permanent doldrums. He writes:

I mean, why shouldn’t we be focused on the business cycle? We’ve suffered the worst cyclical downturn since the Great Depression; in terms of unemployment and output gaps, we have recovered almost none of the lost ground. Millions of willing workers are idle because of lack of demand; let them stay idle, and we can turn this into a long-term structural problem, but right now it is precisely a short-term, cyclical problem.

When Krugman uses "demand," he means "aggregate demand," which economically speaking is a nonsensical term. There is no such thing as "aggregate demand;" Furthermore, people are trying to build up their savings precisely because they want to have some cushion for the future. If they are abstaining from some present spending, it is because of the current recession/depression.

In other words, personal cutbacks in spending are occurring because the economy is in recession; to say otherwise is to violate what Carl Menger calls The Law of Cause and Effect. Yet, Krugman and his followers continue to believe that the recession came about because people stopped spending, period.

I will go further. If governments cut back on present spending and start to get their financial houses in order, then the long run actually will hold much more promise than what will be the case if governments continue their suicidal attempts to spend resources that, frankly, we no longer have.

Does Unlimited Government Spending Bring Prosperity?

Paul Krugman still is on his anti-austerity kick, which I guess is his economic flavor-of-the-week. His blog post on "austerity" and Ireland (among other countries), while clever, really does not answer the question he is asking, plus he inadvertently paints himself into a corner. Let me explain.

First, let us look at what Krugman writes:

...now the cause is fiscal austerity — and we keep hearing about supposed examples of countries that experienced a boom after tightening fiscal policy, supposedly demonstrating that austerity is good, not bad, for employment. First was Canada in the 1990s, which turns out to be a quite different story. Now we’re hearing about Ireland in the 1980s.

So, time for a little research. And whaddya know: this story is also not at all the way it’s being told (pdf). Yes, Ireland had fiscal austerity — but it also benefited from a devaluation and an inflationary boom in the UK.

Oh, and Irish interest rates fell sharply, which was possible because they were very high to begin with; that’s not much of a precedent for the United States today, which starts with very low rates.

So yes, you can boost your economy with fiscal austerity, as long as you also devalue your currency and sharply reduce interest rates; also, incantations will destroy a flock of sheep, if administered with a sufficient portion of arsenic.

We have to remember that Krugman is demanding that governments can bring back prosperity by (1) borrowing trillions of dollars for which there is no appreciable way to pay back the money unless they (2) repudiate the debt by printing money, which is what Krugman wants them to do.

There is nothing surprising here, when one is beholden to Keynesian orthodoxy. When interest rates (as set by the central bank) are at what Krugman calls "zero-bound," then the only entity that can spend freely is government, since it has a legal monopoly on "creating money."

However, Krugman's economic logic in this passage is wanting. First, what does he mean by an "inflationary boom," and why should he care? In Keynesian thinking, inflation is NECESSARY for bringing an economy to "full employment," at least until the economy reaches its highest levels of "capacity." Thus, when one holds to this way of thinking, ALL booms are necessarily "inflationary," as inflation is required for the boom to occur in the first place (and Krugman holds that booms are good).

Second, why did Ireland's interest rates fall? Krugman gives no causality; they just fell. Third, none of this explains why Ireland in the 1980s had a fundamental economic change in which the country went from a quaint, but poor nation that mostly exported people to a place that attracted new investment AND people who wanted to be part of what was happening.

With Krugman, the change just happened, but lots of places have currency devaluations and even lower interest rates, yet do not have paradigm shifts in the economy. In other words, Krugman really has no causality theory for what happened.

James Burnham in a 2003 paper in the Independent Review wrote about the Irish boom, and gives much more detail into what happened. Yet, Krugman, holding to his Keynesian orthodoxy, simply gives us one more example of post hoc ergo propter hoc.

Again, we are dealing with two very different paradigms. In the Keynesian way of thinking, spending is everything. This is very different than "demand" as we know it, economically speaking, in which demand reflects what people want and what they are willing to give up in order to obtain it. In other words, demand cannot be separated from opportunity cost.

In the Keynesian view, however, "demand" really means "aggregate demand," which exists when people have "purchasing power" fueled by money. Thus, when government prints more money, it creates new "purchasing power" and, therefore, new "aggregate demand." There is nothing purposeful about this whole scenario; in fact, there really is nothing economic about it, for real economics deals with opportunity cost, something that pretty much is missing in Keynesianism.

So, we really are arguing two very different views of the world, and I believe that the Austrian view, while hated by the Krugmans of the world, better explains economic phenomena than does Keynesianism. However, don't forget that the very first line of Carl Menger's ground-breaking Principles of Economics makes the important point: "All things are subject to the law of cause and effect." In other words, to Austrians, causality really matters.

We are left, then, with the question that I asked in the title of this post. Krugman assumes that government spending financed via borrowing and printing really exacts no opportunity cost. I cannot accept that view under any circumstances. The fundamental building block of economic thinking is opportunity cost, and to ignore it is to jettison economics in the whole.

Austerity or Reckoning? We Cannot Print Our Way Out of the Crisis

While attending the 2001 ASSA meetings in New Orleans, I was jogging one morning and found myself in the company of a Yale economics professor who taught monetary economics. We had a discussion of approaches, and I explained that I went with the Austrian view, in which one teaches monetary theory from a marginal utility angle. In other words, money is a specialized good used specifically for exchange that is subject to the same laws of economics as any other good.

The Yale prof listened intently and sounded interested. Given that he taught monetary theory from a quantity view of money approach, my viewpoints were foreign to him, but he was not dismissive of what I was saying. Instead, he told me that he was interested and that he had not even thought of looking at money that way. Whether or not I planted a seed of interest, I read today from another Ivy League economics professor, Paul Krugman, that money is so "other worldly" that we really cannot apply economics at all.

Now,Krugman does not give a direct approach of monetary theory in his blog or columns, but it is there in default. Like all Keynesians, he believes that as long as an economy is not running at "capacity," and if interest rates (as set by government monetary authorities) are at or near zero (which Keynesians call a "liquidity trap"), then the only thing that can drive an economy to "full employment" of all resources is "fiscal policy," in which governments borrow and print money in order to push enough spending to those full-employment limits.

This viewpoint also holds that the key to a healthy economy is the rate of unemployment, not just of labor, but of all resources. For example, the "full-employment" of World War II is seen as an economic triumph because anyone who wanted to find work could get a job (provided he or she moved to the population centers where the factories and administrative offices were located). Farmers had huge markets for their crops, and people suddenly had money in their pockets. The fact that the government rationed goods, including food and fuel, is ignored, since people had jobs, and that was the only thing that mattered.

I don't believe that I am misrepresenting Krugman's views here, as they are pretty much standard modern-day Keynesian. The problem, however, as I noted in my post containing Robert Higgs' assessments of Keynesianism, is that this viewpoint has some very unreal assumptions, the most important being that all assets are homogeneous, so it does not matter what is being produced, be they bombs or bagels, as long as labor is being used. Furthermore, the assumptions also rest upon a pure quantity theory of money in which prices themselves are irrelevant, being subservient to a government-calculated "price level."

Another false assumption from this viewpoint is that consumer spending is nothing more than "buying back" the products they created as workers. There is no purposeful behavior here, just a circular motion of production and purchases. As long as consumers have jobs and income, they can continue this circular pattern and the economy will be operating at "full employment." Thus, World War II in this analysis would be a period of "good times."

Professor Higgs, however, takes down even the "war prosperity" myth in this paper. I think a reading of this will change one's viewpoint considerably about the views economists have about World War II.

Unfortunately, this is a very stilted and inaccurate way of looking at the economy, as there really is no plan or purpose on behalf of individuals. Instead, they simply produce, purchase, and consume in a rather mindless fashion, yet that is what Keynesians believe is a "thriving" economy. In Krugman's view, because we are in a "liquidity trap," the only thing that can rescue the economy is government borrowing and spending.

In today's post, Krugman gives what I would call his classic viewpoint of what I have described. Furthermore, in his theoretical world, any spending cutbacks will create needless disaster. After all, if assets are homogeneous, and governments can borrow and print just as long as the economy is operating "below capacity," then it is foolish to stop and engage in "austerity." He writes:

Some thoughts on the fiscal austerity mania now sweeping Europe: is anyone thinking seriously about how this affects the rest of the world, the US included?

We do have a framework for thinking about this issue: the Mundell-Fleming model. And according to that model (does anyone still learn this stuff?), fiscal contraction in one country under floating exchange rates is in fact contractionary for the world as a hole. The reason is that fiscal contraction leads to lower interest rates, which leads to currency depreciation, which improves the trade balance of the contracting country — partly offsetting the fiscal contraction, but also imposing a contraction on the rest of the world. (Rudi Dornbusch’s 1976 Brookings Paper went through all this.)

Now, the situation is complicated by the fact that monetary policy is up against the zero lower bound. Nonetheless, something much like this transmission mechanism seems to be happening right now, with the weakness of the euro turning eurozone fiscal contraction into a global problem.

Folks, this is getting ugly. And the US needs to be thinking about how to insulate itself from European masochism.

However, if assets are heterogeneous, and if money is a good subject to the laws of economics, and if the Europeans must be able to produce real goods in order to pay for their welfare states, then Krugman is uttering foolishness. For the past three years, governments have been boosting their spending to irresponsible levels (at Krugman's urging) and printing money like mad in order to try to "spend" their way back to prosperity, and we are seeing the results: unemployment is at double-digit levels and all of this spending has created zombie financial institutions that on paper are "solvent" but in reality are on the brink.

Furthermore, the wave of government debt creates real liabilities that reflects the perilous situation that exists today. Instead of creating "full employment," these policies have furthered the malinvestments that are at the heart of this downturn. Unfortunately, Krugman refuses to see this point, so he will continue to demand that governments create even more malinvestments, all in the name of "fighting the depression."

At the heart of this matter is the Keynesian myth that money is something extra-economic, and that printing more of it (provided the economy is at less than full employment) will put us back to work and create prosperity. Instead, the current policies of the U.S. and European governments are digging the hole deeper, and Krugman is claiming that the only thing that will work is for us to use bigger shovels.

Can Krugman Explain the 1983 Recovery?

The last time the United States saw double-digit unemployment was during the recession of 1982, which seemed to spell huge problems for then-President Ronald Reagan. He had pushed through a cut in tax rates (across-the-board) with the top rate dropped from 70 percent to 50 percent, and the federal deficit was skyrocketing to record nominal levels (past $200 billion in 1983).

There are two ways to look at that recession and the subsequent recovery. The first is through the standard Keynesian lens with a few twists. I remember reading an editorial in the Atlanta Constitution entitled "Tax Hike or Recession" in which the writer claimed that unless the government raised the top rates back to 70 percent, interest rates would continue to rise, and the economy would move into recession. Congress did not raise income tax rates (although it did pass a tax increase in other areas which Austrian Economists believe had a stifling effect on the economy).

Now, no self-respecting Keynesian economist would argue for a tax increase during a recession, although they do have a "balanced-budget multiplier" in the Keynesian arsenal that "proves" a tax increase will stimulate the economy more than letting individuals keep their earnings. (This raises the question as to whether or not a 100 percent tax would really do the trick, although most Keynesians have not willingly taken their "balanced-budget multiplier" to its logical conclusion.)

Nonetheless, the Keynesian analysis is fairly simple in its causality: recessions come about because people spend less money. Furthermore, Keynesians believe that higher interest rates are a cause of recessions, as was the case in 1982, and any decrease in the rate of inflation also will have negative economic effects, as economic growth cannot occur without inflation.

If I can characterize the Keynesian position from an Austrian point of view, it is that Keynesian economics is based upon the following fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc, or "after this, therefore, because of this." For that matter, Keynesians employ the same fallacy in order to explain economic recoveries, which could be explained in the following form: "After federal budget deficits, therefore, because of federal budget deficits."

There is no doubt that federal budget deficits grew during the early 1980s, and the government borrowed huge sums to paper over the differences. However, the question as to whether or not the borrowed expenditures fueled the real economic recovery of the 1980s is legitimate. Government statistics tell us that before and during the recession, expenditures as percentage of U.S. GDP rose in military spending, and in Social Security and Medicare, along with net interest on the federal debt.

Furthermore, during the recession huge portions of what might be called the "old economy" simply disappeared. Cities like Cleveland and Pittsburgh lost industries to the point where the term "Rust Belt" was used to describe the swath of northern states steel mills and other factories became little more than scrap metal. Unlike previous economic recoveries, hundreds of thousands of laid-off workers were not called back to their old jobs because those production facilities disappeared. (One might remember that Billy Joel's song "Allentown" was a major hit in 1982.)

Yet, the economy clearly recovered and it is obvious, in hindsight, that this recovery was different than what had been the case during the 1970s and before. First, this was a recovery that was not accompanied by high rates of inflation. Second, the recovery was centered not in the traditional manufacturing areas, but rather in the development of computers and telecommunications.

Third, financing was made available through the short-lived methods pioneered by Michael Milken, the so-called Junk Bond King, who helped bring about a lot of corporate restructuring that needed to take place. Fourth, the ending of the transportation cartel (i.e. "deregulation") enabled goods to be shipped more quickly, cheaply, and efficiently. (The cost-saving "Just-in-Time" methods of production simply would not have been possible had the old regulations governing trucking and railroads.)

So, despite the fact that inflation went down and interest rates stayed high, the United States had a robust economic recovery in the mid-1980s. This recovery defied the Keynesian rules; indeed, it was the closest thing one will see to an Austrian recovery in our lifetimes.

The so-called founder of the Austrian School, Carl Menger, wrote in his groundbreaking 1871 book, Principles of Economics, "All things are subject to the Law of Cause and Effect." Indeed, we begin with causality. Unfortunately, Keynesians consistently (at least they ARE consistent) confuse effect with cause, and that makes all of the difference.

Robert Higgs versus Paul Krugman

Because Paul Krugman is the most visible spokesman for the Keynesian economic viewpoint (or, at least what Robert Higgs calls "vulgar Keynesianism"), I tend to deal with his statements from the New York Times, as it is convenient to do so, and Krugman clearly does a good job of stating his viewpoints from there. (I tend to avoid statements by James Galbraith, which are like Krugman's, although Galbraith does not do as well in squeezing the concepts into small spaces.)

One prominent economist who also understands the modern Keynesian orthodoxy is Higgs, who edits the Independent Review and who has been an eloquent voice against what Krugman and others promoting. Today, I examine a couple of articles that Higgs wrote in which he clearly lays out why it is that Krugman's orthodoxy is destructive.

In this article published on Lew Rockwell's page almost a year ago, Higgs goes to the heart of the differences between the Austrians and the Keynesians, writing:

The root problem, I believe, lies in the aggregative character of contemporary thinking about macroeconomic fluctuations. In this view, rising aggregate real output is good, no matter what the composition of the newly produced goods and services. A recession, which most analysts understand as a sustained decline of aggregate real output, is bad, and, in their view, it should be combated by fiscal "stimulus" and by expansionary monetary policy in order to reverse the decline in aggregate demand. They do not worry about – indeed, they rarely even pay much attention to – the makeup of the aggregate output that is added during business expansions, lost during business recessions, or brought into being by the government's compensating fiscal and monetary actions. Output is output; spending is spending. In fact, the whole idea of using government spending to offset reduced spending by investors or consumers turns on this assumption that a dollar spent is a dollar spent, regardless of what it is spent for.

However, that thinking, writes Higgs, is wrong because of its insistence upon the homogeneity of investment and output:

In today's vulgar Keynesian environment, investors and economists do not appreciate how the seeds of macroeconomic busts are sowed by artificially created credit that is employed to finance investments that would not be undertaken if they had to be financed by real savings – investments known in economic theory as malinvestments. When a large volume of malinvestments has been undertaken during a boom (e.g., much of the investment in residential housing and commercial real-estate development between 2002 and 2006), and when for whatever reason the pace of new credit creation slows, causing interest rates to rise, then the unsustainability of these malinvestments becomes increasingly apparent. More and more of them are terminated, often in unfinished condition, and many such projects go bankrupt for want of buyers willing and able to pay for them in the market. (Emphasis Higgs')

A "recovery" created by such means is no recovery at all, as Higgs explains:

If the government and the central bank use their fiscal and monetary policies to prop up these malinvestments, they do not solve the basic problem; they only paper it over for the time being. The vast assistance given recently to financial institutions embarrassed by investments in bad real-estate-related securities, for example, has allowed these institutions to delay the write-offs and other balance-sheet adjustments that would reflect the errors they have made. The bailouts have created a large number of zombie financial institutions, much like the ones that caused the Japanese economy to stagnate during the 1990s and later. Owners and managers of financial firms laden with rotten securities have been holding out for government rescues of various sorts, rather than carrying out the required restructuring, which in many cases must include bankruptcy proceedings.

Just as the malinvestments were made possible in the first place by effusions of artificially created credit and hence artificially depressed interest rates, so now the Treasury and the Fed are keeping the owners of these malinvestments afloat by further effusions of artificially created credit. But so long as these inherently unsustainable projects continue, they constitute a huge legion of the living dead. They may look viable, but their viability hinges entirely on de facto subsidies via the government's various bailout schemes. Such projects will remain unsustainable unless continually propped up at the expense of the general public, who will suffer because of increased ordinary taxes or a mounting inflation tax on their dollar-denominated assets. If the government goes forward in this fashion, it will be sustaining an economy rife with malinvestments kept in operation only by constant transfusions of other people's wealth channeled to the zombie projects by the Treasury and the Fed – a permanent policy of robbing prudent, responsible Peter to pay imprudent, irresponsible Paul. No sound, long-run economic development can be based on such productivity-sapping transfers of wealth into projects that are not worth the expense of keeping them going and which misallocate resources to the overall economy's detriment so long as they continue.

In this article, published in March, 2009, Higgs goes into more detail explaining why the aggregation of economic activity into the Y = C + I + G + (X-M) equation is just plain wrong and ultimately destructive. Writes Higgs:

This way of compressing diverse, economy-wide transactions into single variables has the effect of suppressing recognition of the complex relationships and differences within each of the aggregates. Thus, in this framework, the effect of adding a million dollars of investment spending for teddy-bear inventories is the same as the effect of adding a million dollars of investment spending for digging a new copper mine. Likewise, the effect of adding a million dollars of consumption spending for movie tickets is the same as the effect of adding a million dollars of consumption spending for gasoline. Likewise, the effect of adding a million dollars of government spending for children’s inoculations against polio is the same as the effect of adding a million dollars of government spending for 7.62 mm ammunition. It does not take much thought to conceive of ways in which suppression of the differences within each of the aggregates might cause our thinking about the economy to go seriously awry.

In fact, “the economy” does not produce an undifferentiated mass we call “output.” Instead, the millions of producers who bring forth “aggregate supply” provide an almost infinite variety of specific goods and services that differ in countless ways. Moreover, an immense amount of what goes on in a market economy consists of dealings among producers who supply no “final” goods and services at all, but instead supply raw materials, components, intermediate products, and services to one another. Because these producers are connected in an intricate pattern of relations, which must assume certain proportions if the entire arrangement is to work effectively, critical consequences turn on what in particular gets produced, when, where, and how.

These extraordinarily complex micro-relationships are what we are really referring to when we speak of “the economy.” It is definitely not a single, simple process for producing a uniform, aggregate glop. Moreover, when we speak of “economic action,” we are referring to the choices that millions of diverse participants make in selecting one course of action and setting aside a possible alternative. Without choice, constrained by scarcity, no true economic action takes place. Thus, vulgar Keynesianism, which purports to be an economic model or at least a coherent framework of economic analysis, actually excludes the very possibility of genuine economic action, substituting for it a simple, mechanical conception, the intellectual equivalent of a baby toy.

Compare this to what Krugman claims: that all that is needed for the government to "create prosperity" is for the central banks to print money and the government to borrow and spend. Yet, the profession claims that Krugman is the better economist? Somehow, I doubt it.